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ABSTRACT 
  Although the securities industry is primarily regulated by specific 
rules, it is also governed by general principles. When conduct violates 
a rule, the regulatory response is obvious—enforce the rule. The issue 
is more difficult when conduct does not violate a rule but violates a 
principle. A regulator can excuse the conduct on the ground that the 
law is unclear and prohibit the conduct going forward through 
rulemaking. Or, the regulator can punish the conduct through what I 
call a “principles-based” enforcement action. Since 2002, there has 
been a surge of principles-based enforcement actions, provoking 
criticism that regulators are engaging in “Regulation by 
Enforcement.” This Article compares these regulatory tools and 
proposes criteria to guide regulators in choosing between them in 
communicating legal norms to the regulated. 
  These approaches represent two paradigms that must coexist but 
can also compete. Rulemaking reflects the mentality that securities 
regulation is a technical enterprise that should be left to experts who 
have created a comprehensive, efficient administrative scheme. 
Principles-based enforcement actions reflect the demand that 
regulators punish conduct that violates principles reflecting public 
values. For the most part, the regulated prefer a predictable regulatory 
regime, which rulemaking provides, whereas the public prefers 
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decisive responses, which principles-based enforcement actions 
provide. 
  Based on these preferences, public choice theory would contend 
that regulators are more likely to address arguable misconduct by 
aggressively enforcing principles when public influence is high, while 
utilizing rulemaking when the regulated are influential. But this 
account is too simplistic—although the relative strength of interest 
groups can affect the incentives of regulators, their choices are subject 
to significant constraints. For example, a regulator cannot credibly 
bring a principles-based enforcement action without uncovering 
specific evidence of misconduct. 
  Even if regulators are so constrained, they should counter the 
perception that their choices are made to appease interest groups by 
considering the circumstances in which principles-based enforcement 
is appropriate. In doing so, regulators should take into account both 
the need for a predictable regulatory regime and the need to punish 
conduct that violates principles. They should consider: (1) whether the 
principle being enforced is well established or novel, (2) whether the 
application of the principle is consistent with existing rules, (3) 
whether there is compelling evidence establishing the misconduct, and 
(4) whether the conduct caused foreseeable public harm. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Introduction............................................................................................. 627 
I. The Reign of Rulemaking .............................................................. 634 
A. The “Regulation by Enforcement” Critique.......................... 635 
B. The Case of Regulation FD ..................................................... 638 
C. Rulemaking vs. Principles-Based Enforcement..................... 639 
II. The Resurgence of Principles-Based Enforcement..................... 642 
A. The IPO Cases ........................................................................... 643 
1. The Market for “Hot IPOs” ................................................ 643 
2. The Enforcement Action against Credit  
Suisse First Boston........................................................ 645 
3. Lack of Regulation ............................................................... 647 
4. The Commercial Bribery Principle..................................... 648 
02__PARK.DOC 12/20/2007  10:10:17 AM 
2007] SECURITIES REGULATION 627 
B. The Research Analyst Cases.................................................... 651 
1. The Merging of Research and Investment Banking......... 651 
2. The New York Attorney General’s  
Investigation of Merrill Lynch..................................... 653 
3. Lack of Regulation ............................................................... 654 
4. The Anti-Fraud Principle .................................................... 655 
C. The Mutual Fund Cases............................................................ 657 
1. Mutual Funds ........................................................................ 657 
2. The New York Attorney General’s  
Investigation of Canary................................................ 658 
3. Lack of Regulation ............................................................... 660 
4. The Anti-Fraud and Fiduciary Duty Principles ................ 661 
III. Competing Paradigms..................................................................... 662 
A. Rulemaking and the Administrative Paradigm ..................... 663 
1. Administrative Expertise..................................................... 664 
2. Participative Process............................................................. 665 
3. Use of Cost/Benefit Analysis .............................................. 667 
B. Principles-Based Enforcement Actions and  
the Public Values Paradigm.................................................. 667 
1. Enforcement Expertise ........................................................ 669 
2. Closed Process....................................................................... 670 
3. Application of Values .......................................................... 671 
C. Tension between Paradigms .................................................... 672 
IV. Choosing between Rulemaking and Enforcement...................... 674 
A. Public Choice Theory and Regulatory Choice ...................... 675 
B. Limits of the Public Choice Theory ........................................ 678 
C. A Framework for Determining Regulatory Choice.............. 680 
1. Conduct Violates a Principle Set Forth in a Rule............. 682 
2. Conduct Violates both a Rule and a Principle .................. 684 
3. Conduct Is Unregulated by a Rule but  
Violates a Principle....................................................... 684 
4. Conduct Is in an Area Heavily Regulated by  
Rules but Violates a Principle ..................................... 686 
5. Conduct Is Sanctioned by a Rule but  
Violates a Principle....................................................... 687 
Conclusion ............................................................................................... 689 
INTRODUCTION 
Since 2002, there have been an unprecedented number of 
innovative securities enforcement actions directed at areas arguably 
02__PARK.DOC 12/20/2007  10:10:17 AM 
628 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 57:625 
unregulated by rules. For their proponents, these actions have 
punished companies for conduct that violated fundamental principles. 
For their critics, these actions have been disruptive and circumvented 
a rulemaking system that gives companies notice and an opportunity 
to shape legal norms. These arguments reveal conflicting views about 
a regulatory system built on both rules and principles.1 This Article 
analyzes these competing paradigms and how regulators choose 
between them in communicating legal norms to the regulated.2 It 
offers a framework to guide the regulatory response to misconduct 
that does not clearly violate a rule. 
For the most part, the securities industry is regulated by specific 
requirements set forth in rules. There is a rule requiring broker-
dealer firms to maintain a certain amount of capital.3 There are rules 
 
 1. In the realm of securities regulation, the distinction between rules and principles has 
been discussed in terms of whether the regulatory scheme should shift from a rules-based 
system to a principles-based system. See, e.g., COMM. ON CAPITAL MKTS. REGULATION, 
INTERIM REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON CAPITAL MARKETS REGULATION 8–9 (2006) 
[hereinafter INTERIM REPORT ON CAPITAL MARKETS REGULATION], available at http://www. 
capmktsreg.org/pdfs/11.30Committee_Interim_ReportREV2.pdf (advocating a shift from 
prescriptive rules to broader principles); John C. Coffee, Jr., Gatekeeper Failure and Reform: 
The Challenge of Fashioning Relevant Reforms, 84 B.U. L. REV. 301, 342–43 (2004) (“Sarbanes-
Oxley ushers in and accelerates a major and probably inevitable transition, which will move us 
from a rules-based system of financial disclosure to a principles-based system.”); Cristie Ford, 
New Governance, Compliance, and Principles-Based Regulation, 45 AM. BUS. L.J. (forthcoming 
2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=970130 (analyzing Canada’s consideration of 
principles-based regulation). Lawrence Cunningham argues persuasively that no system is 
entirely rules-based or entirely principles-based. See Lawrence A. Cunningham, A Prescription 
to Retire the Rhetoric of “Principles-Based Systems” in Corporate Law, Securities Regulation and 
Accounting, 60 VAND. L. REV. (forthcoming Oct.–Nov. 2007). 
The distinction between rules and principles is amorphous. Ronald Dworkin simply refers 
to “principles” as “the whole set of . . . standards other than rules . . . .” RONALD DWORKIN, 
TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 22 (1977). While this Article uses the rules/principles distinction, it 
does not attempt to precisely define it or take a position on whether a rules-based system is 
better than a principles-based system. Instead, its focus is on the regulatory tools of rulemaking 
and enforcement, which have distinguishable procedural characteristics. 
 2. Such decisions have been referred to as a “choice in policymaking form” by M. 
Elizabeth Magill in an article describing how courts give agencies such as the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) wide discretion in choosing between regulatory tools such as 
rulemaking, enforcement, and adjudication. See M. Elizabeth Magill, Agency Choice of 
Policymaking Form, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1383, 1437 (2004). Magill notes that little has been 
written about the way in which regulators choose between rulemaking and enforcement. Id. at 
1442–43 (“There are few efforts to describe or explain how agencies choose among their 
available policymaking forms.”); see also Steven P. Croley, Theories of Regulation: 
Incorporating the Administrative Process, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 6 (1998) (noting that 
administrative law theories “fail to incorporate any well developed vision of the administrative 
process—that is, of administrative law and administrative practice”). 
 3. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3–1 (2007). 
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listing in exhaustive detail the facts a company must disclose when 
issuing securities.4 There is a rule requiring investment advisers to 
register with securities regulators before advising clients.5 There are 
rules prohibiting specific types of manipulation of securities 
offerings.6 These rules are part of an extensive administrative scheme 
and were passed after a deliberative process in which industry was 
given notice of the proposed rule and an opportunity to comment. 
Simultaneously, the securities industry is governed by broad 
principles largely set forth in statutes and the common law.7 Fraud, an 
open-ended concept, has long been prohibited.8 Broker-dealers are 
required to conform to high standards of commercial trade and 
honor.9 Investment advisers are required to act as fiduciaries with 
respect to their customers.10 Principles are largely defined through an 
adversarial enforcement process that can be more rapid than 
rulemaking but can also cause significant disruption. 
When conduct violates a rule, the regulatory response is clear—
enforce the rule. But what if a securities regulator uncovers 
misconduct that was previously unregulated or arguably does not 
violate a particular rule, what I will refer to as “arguable 
 
 4. Id. pts. 210, 228. 
 5. Id. § 240.15. 
 6. Id. §§ 242.100–.105. 
 7. Because rules themselves can set forth principles, I distinguish rules reflecting general 
principles from rules that make specific prescriptions, which have been referred to as 
“prescriptive rules.” See INTERIM REPORT ON CAPITAL MARKETS REGULATION, supra note 1, 
at 8; MCKINSEY & CO., SUSTAINING NEW YORK’S AND THE US’ GLOBAL FINANCIAL 
LEADERSHIP 3–5, 95–129, available at http://www.senate.gov/~schumer/SchumerWebsite/ 
pressroom/special_reports/2007/NY_REPORT%20_FINAL.pdf. I include rules reflecting 
principles in the category of “principles.” When I refer to “rules” I am referring only to 
“prescriptive rules.” 
 8. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (prohibiting certain deceptive devices); see Ernst & Ernst v. 
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 203 (1976) (noting that legislative history described section 10(b) as a 
“catchall” clause enabling the SEC “to deal with new manipulative (or cunning) devices.” 
(internal quotations omitted)); The Martin Act, N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 352 et seq. (McKinney 
2006). 
 9. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, NASD Manual, Rules of the Association, Rule 2110, 
http://finra.complinet.com/finra/index.html (last visited Oct. 12, 2007). 
 10. Investment Company Act of 1940 § 36(a), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35 (2000); see also SEC v. 
Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 191 (1963) (“The Investment Advisers Act 
of 1940 thus reflects a congressional recognition ‘of the delicate fiduciary nature of an 
investment advisory relationship,’ as well as a congressional intent to eliminate, or at least to 
expose, all conflicts of interest which might incline an investment adviser—consciously or 
unconsciously—to render advice which was not disinterested.”); EBC I, Inc. v. Goldman, Sachs 
& Co., 832 N.E.2d 26, 11 (2005) (discussing the common-law fiduciary duty). 
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misconduct”?11 The target asserts it did not have adequate notice that 
its conduct was wrong in relation to existing rules. But there is a case 
that the conduct violates a broader principle. Should the regulator 
respond by excusing the conduct but subsequently making it clear 
that the conduct is prohibited through rulemaking? Or should the 
regulator punish the conduct and enforce the broader principle 
through what I call a “principles-based enforcement action”?12 
This is not just a theoretical choice. When responding to 
pervasive conflicts of interest caused by the close relationship 
between equity research and investment banking, the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) initially responded by proposing new 
rules to regulate that relationship.13 The New York Attorney General 
chose to pursue an investigation, resulting in a principles-based 
enforcement action, significant penalties, and structural reform.14 
In a number of other areas, securities regulators15 have 
dramatically shifted in their response to arguable misconduct, acting 
through principles-based enforcement actions rather than 
rulemaking.16 This new pattern reverses the prior regulatory 
 
 11. There are obviously different degrees of “arguable misconduct,” and I do not attempt 
to precisely define the term. 
 12. In contrast, straightforward enforcement of a rule can be called a “rules-based 
enforcement action.” 
 13. See Charles Gasperino & Michael Schroeder, Pitt and Spitzer Butted Heads to Overhaul 
Wall Street Research, WALL ST. J., Oct. 31, 2002, at A1 (“The SEC chairman believed that the 
solution to the problem was developing a new set of standards for analysts, while at the same 
time directing self-regulatory organizations, such as the National Association of Securities 
Dealers and the New York Stock Exchange, to examine conflicts of interest and draw up new 
rules on analyst compensation and disclosure practices.”). 
 14. See id. Of these three results, this Article focuses on the initial decision to punish 
arguable misconduct with a principles-based enforcement action. I leave analysis of the 
imposition of penalties and structural reforms resulting from such actions for another day. 
 15. In this Article, when I refer to “securities regulators,” I include not only the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC) but also state securities regulators such as the New York 
Attorney General as well as self-regulatory organizations such as the National Association of 
Securities Dealers (NASD) and the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). Of course, there are 
differences in the ways that state regulators and the SEC regulate. For example, only the SEC 
can pass nationwide rules. Although state regulators cannot pass such rules, they have the 
choice of deferring to SEC rulemaking rather than bringing a principles-based enforcement 
action. For the sake of simplicity, I refer to these actors collectively and leave the implications of 
the trend toward increased state involvement in securities regulation for another day. 
 16. See, e.g., Complaint, New York v. Canary Capital Partners, LLC (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Sept. 3, 
2003) (undocketed) [hereinafter Canary Complaint], available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/ 
press/2003/sep/canary_complaint.pdf; Complaint, SEC v. Credit Suisse First Boston Corp., No. 
02-90 (D.D.C. Jan. 22, 2002) [hereinafter CSFB Complaint]; Affidavit of Eric R. Dinallo in 
Support of Application for an Order Pursuant to General Business Law Section 354, In re 
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approach, which saw rulemaking as the primary source of legal norms 
that comes necessarily before enforcement actions.17 For example, in 
the late 1990s, regulators responded to reports that companies were 
selectively disclosing material nonpublic information to favored 
research analysts by passing a rule making it clear that the conduct 
was wrong rather than by punishing the conduct through enforcement 
actions.18 
Skeptics have attacked these principles-based actions as 
“Regulation by Enforcement,”19 a phrase criticizing the tendency of 
 
Spitzer v. Merrill Lynch & Co., No. 02-401522 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr. 8, 2002) [hereinafter Dinallo 
Aff.]; Stephen M. Cutler, Dir., Div. of Enforcement, SEC, Speech to the 24th Annual Ray 
Garrett Jr. Corporate & Securities Law Institute, Chi, Ill. (Apr. 29, 2004), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch042904smc.htm (“[A]ll but three of the 12 penalties of $50 
million or more obtained in Commission settlements since 1986 were obtained in the last twelve 
months.”). 
 17. This emphasis on rulemaking was part of a general trend among administrative 
agencies. See Magill, supra note 2, at 1398 (“[B]y the mid-1970s, rulemaking was the primary 
and preferred mode of making policy for many agencies.”). The shift by securities regulators to 
principles-based enforcement actions may be part of a more general trend toward using 
litigation as a policymaking tool. Id. (“Some [scholars] point to the rise of agency litigation as a 
strategy for achieving regulatory objectives.”). 
 18. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 243.100–.103 (2007). 
 19. See, e.g., INTERIM REPORT ON CAPITAL MARKETS REGULATION, supra note 1, at 9 
(“Enforcement actions in recent years have been used as a basis for ad hoc rule-writing.”); 
Jonathan R. Macey, Who is Protecting the Investor?: State-Federal Relations Post-Eliot Spitzer, 
70 BROOK. L. REV. 117, 128 n.36 (2004) (“Rulemaking by enforcement refers to the 
presumptively illegitimate process by which regulators proceed with rulemaking ‘ex post,’ i.e. 
after certain conduct occurs, rather than through more legitimate formal notice-and-rulemaking 
procedures.”); Daniel Dunaief, SEC to Set Tough Analyst Rules, DAILY NEWS (N.Y.), Apr. 10, 
2003, at 68 (“There are a lot of smart people who haven’t been consulted . . . [t]his is regulation 
by enforcement.” (quoting Saul Cohen, partner at the firm Proskauer Rose)); Michael G. Oxley, 
Letter to the Editor, Who Should Police the Financial Markets?, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 2002, at B11 
(“In this time of lagging investor confidence, policymaking through litigation discussed in a 
closed conference room is not healthy for the U.S. capital markets, and not good for 
investors.”); Tom Petruno, SEC, Fund Firm May Face Off, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 11, 2005, at C1 (“A 
key question is whether the Republican majority on the commission would consider a solid case, 
or an example of what some SEC critics label ‘regulation by enforcement’—rewriting industry 
rules by suing a particular party instead of simply ordering changes for all players.”); Stephen 
M. Cutler, Dir., Div. of Enforcement, SEC, Remarks at the F. Hodge O’Neal Corporate and 
Securities Law Symposium (Feb. 21, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/ 
spch022103smc.htm (“As an enforcement lawyer, I am quite familiar with the complaint raised 
by defendants or respondents, and even by an occasional SEC Commissioner, that a proposed 
settlement amounts to rulemaking by enforcement.”); Karen Donovan, Under Siege, 
REGISTERED REP., Sept. 1, 2005, http://registeredrep.com/regulatory/finance_siege/ (“The 
defense bar alleges that regulators are now making up rules as they go along, a phenomenon  
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securities regulators to establish norms ex post through enforcement 
actions rather than ex ante through rulemaking.20 The “Regulation by 
Enforcement” critique notes that enforcement actions can cause 
significant economic disruption. Industry may be unfairly surprised 
when regulators advance broad principles in novel ways through 
enforcement. Also, by developing regulatory norms through 
enforcement, regulators sidestep the extensive administrative scheme 
comprised of rules constructed through expert input and deliberation. 
For the most part, the regulated prefer the rulemaking process 
because it is more predictable and can be influenced. Rulemaking is 
premised on the assumption that experts should construct cost-
effective norms in collaboration with industry, reflecting what I call 
an administrative paradigm. On the other hand, the public prefers 
principles-based enforcement actions because they are decisive. 
Principles-based enforcement actions offer a more confrontational 
approach directed at conduct that violates societal values, reflecting 
what I call the public values paradigm. Although these two paradigms 
must coexist, there are times when they compete. 
Given these preferences, public choice theory predicts that 
regulators will be more likely to respond to arguable misconduct with 
rulemaking when the influence of the regulated is high and more 
likely to respond with principles-based enforcement when public 
influence is high. Over time, there may be a feedback effect that 
results in regulatory cycles. A period in which a more passive 
 
they call ‘regulation by enforcement.’ The enforcement cases keep coming, even as the SEC 
proposes rules to broaden and clarify duties that it says [broker-dealers] have been violating.”). 
The role of litigation in establishing norms has been an issue in other areas such as 
environmental regulation. E.g., Andrew P. Morriss, Bruce Yandle & Andrew Dorchak, 
Choosing How to Regulate, 29 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 179, 248–50 (2005) (analyzing when 
agencies such as the EPA decide whether to use rulemaking versus litigation to promulgate 
norms). See generally REGULATION THROUGH LITIGATION (W. Kip Vicusi ed., 2002) 
(analyzing the formation of norms in tobacco regulation, firearms, lead-based paint hazards, 
breast implants, malpractice and legal reform); Thomas O. McGarity, Douglas Kysar & Karen 
Sokol, The Truth about Torts: Lawyers, Guns, and Money, CENTER FOR PROGRESSIVE 
REFORM PUBLICATION, July 2006, at 3 (criticizing regulation by litigation trope); Robert B. 
Reich, Regulation Is Out, Litigation Is In, THE AMERICAN PROSPECT ONLINE, Feb. 11,  
1999, http://www.prospect.org/cs/articles?article=regulation_is_out_litigation_is_in (discussing 
tobacco and handgun litigations and observing: “The era of big government may be over, but 
the era of regulation through litigation has just begun.”). 
 20. See ROBERTA KARMEL, REGULATION BY PROSECUTION (1982) (first setting forth the 
”Regulation by Enforcement” critique). A later article coined the phrase “Regulation by 
Enforcement.” See Harvey L. Pitt & Karen L. Shapiro, Securities Regulation by Enforcement: A 
Look Ahead at the Next Decade, 7 YALE J. ON REG. 149, 149 (1990). 
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rulemaking approach dominates may lead to regulatory gaps, 
aggressive conduct that harms the public, and public outrage. On the 
other hand, a period of aggressive principles-based enforcement 
actions may lead to the exhaustion of cases in which there is evidence 
of specific wrongdoing, criticisms of regulatory overreaching, and 
mobilization by the regulated. 
But the public choice account, which implies that regulatory 
choices are essentially efforts to appease different interests, is 
incomplete. Regulators are constrained in their choice between 
rulemaking and principles-based enforcement by the nature of the 
facts they uncover. To the extent that allegations of misconduct are 
generalized and theoretical, rulemaking may be a more appropriate 
initial response because there may be no basis for a principles-based 
enforcement action. In contrast, when there is specific evidence of 
serious misconduct, it is difficult for regulators to ignore such 
evidence to appease industry. Of course, regulators may have greater 
incentives and ability to initiate aggressive investigations when there 
is public pressure, but their decision to act is not solely based on 
meeting the preferences of interest groups. 
Even if they are so constrained, regulators should be aware of 
the public choice critique and counter it by considering certain 
criteria to guide their choice between rulemaking and principles-
based enforcement. In doing so, they should consider the regulatory 
needs for predictability and the punishment of conduct that violates 
principles. This Article offers a framework that considers the 
concerns raised by the administrative and public values paradigms 
and guides regulators in choosing between rulemaking and principles-
based enforcement actions in communicating legal norms to the 
regulated. 
In determining whether to respond to arguable misconduct with 
a principles-based enforcement action rather than rulemaking, 
regulators should consider: (1) whether the applicable principle is 
novel or well defined; (2) whether the application of the principle is 
consistent with existing rules; (3) whether there is compelling 
evidence of misconduct; and (4) whether the misconduct caused 
significant, foreseeable public harm. 
I illustrate the application of these factors to five ways in which 
conduct interacts with rules and principles: (1) conduct violates a 
principle set forth in a rule; (2) conduct violates both a rule and a 
principle; (3) conduct is in an area that is unregulated by rules, does 
not violate a rule, but violates a principle; (4) conduct is in an area 
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that is heavily regulated by rules, does not violate a rule, but violates 
a principle; and (5) conduct is sanctioned by a rule but violates a 
principle. Regulators should be most inclined to use principles-based 
enforcement actions in scenario (1) and least inclined to use 
principles-based enforcement actions in scenario (5). 
In Part I, I describe how for a period during the 1990s, 
rulemaking was the likely response to arguable misconduct. I discuss 
the “Regulation by Enforcement” critique to illustrate the distinction 
between rulemaking and principles-based enforcement actions as 
regulatory tools. I illustrate the influence of the “Regulation by 
Enforcement” critique through the case of Regulation FD (Fair 
Disclosure), in which the SEC chose a rulemaking rather than a 
principles-based enforcement response to arguable misconduct. 
In Part II, I describe the resurgence of principles-based 
enforcement actions that began in 2002. In three major areas, 
government regulators responded to arguable misconduct through 
aggressive principles-based enforcement actions. 
In Part III, I argue that the regulated generally prefer 
rulemaking and the public generally prefers principles-based 
enforcement actions. The rulemaking and principles-based 
enforcement approaches respectively represent two distinct 
regulatory paradigms, an administrative and a public values 
paradigm, reflecting different views about the process of generating 
legal norms as well as their substance. 
In Part IV, I analyze how regulators choose between rulemaking 
and principles-based enforcement actions. Public choice theory would 
predict that the choice is largely determined by the relative influence 
of the public and of the regulated. These influences can shift over 
time, causing regulatory cycles. I argue that this account is incomplete 
and that regulators are more constrained in their choice of regulatory 
response than an uncritical application of public choice theory would 
predict. I offer a framework to guide regulators in deciding how to 
choose between rulemaking and principles-based enforcement actions 
in communicating legal norms to the regulated. 
I.  THE REIGN OF RULEMAKING 
The main advantage of a rules-based regulatory regime is its 
predictability. The regulated can make decisions without worrying 
that their actions will be second-guessed by regulators. When 
regulators develop norms through enforcement actions, they insert 
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uncertainty into the system. This basic idea was set forth forcefully by 
the influential “Regulation by Enforcement” critique. 
A. The “Regulation by Enforcement” Critique 
The first form of the critique was set forth in a 1982 book by 
former SEC Commissioner Roberta Karmel, Regulation by 
Prosecution.21 In that book, Karmel criticized the tendency of the SEC 
to make policy through enforcement actions rather than through 
rulemaking. As a result, she argued, the SEC was unnecessarily 
antagonistic toward business and pursued cases that were only 
tenuously related to securities regulation. She gave examples such as 
enforcement actions in the 1970s against companies for paying bribes 
in foreign countries in which the SEC tried to expand its jurisdiction 
to areas tangentially related to the securities laws.22 
Harvey Pitt, a leading securities law practitioner who later 
became SEC Chairman, advanced the next variation of the critique. 
In the 1990 article Regulation by Enforcement, Pitt and his coauthor, 
Karen Shapiro, used the phrase to criticize the SEC’s efforts against 
insider trading. Pitt and Shapiro defined “Regulation by 
Enforcement” as the SEC’s practice of using “enforcement 
proceedings to develop new legal theories and remedies.”23 As 
Karmel had observed earlier,24 Pitt and Shapiro noted that 
[t]he SEC has, at times, resorted to ad hoc enforcement of the 
federal securities laws in particular contexts, in the absence of 
meaningful advance guidance (or warning) to those subject to the 
agency’s jurisdiction, in large measure because of the agency’s 
 
 21. KARMEL, supra note 20. 
 22. Id. at 146–59. 
 23. Pitt & Shapiro, supra note 20, at 155 (emphasis omitted). An article in the 
environmental law context refers to the strategy as “Regulation-by-litigation,” where 
[r]ather than issue a proposed rule or invite affected parties to negotiate, an agency 
sues one or more regulated entities, charging them with violation of an existing 
statute, regulation or common law rule. The lawsuit is often based on a novel 
interpretation of the statute or regulation and may concern behavior that the 
regulated entities believe the agency has accepted in the past. Using the threat of 
substantial liability for the alleged breach, the agency then persuades or coerces the 
regulated entity to agree to a consent decree or injunctive relief that includes 
imposition of substantive regulatory provisions. 
Morriss, Yandle & Dorchak, supra note 19, at 203. 
 24. KARMEL, supra note 20, at 95–98. 
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institutional fear that any specific regulations it might promulgate 
could prove underinclusive or susceptible of easy evasion.25 
Pitt and Shapiro characterized the SEC’s efforts against insider 
trading as “Regulation by Enforcement.”26 Insider trading was and 
still is an offense for which the SEC and Congress have not precisely 
defined the applicable legal norm.27 Instead, the body of law 
governing insider trading was created in an ad hoc way through 
enforcement actions pursued by SEC staff and approved by lower 
courts.28 As a result, Pitt and Shapiro argued, individuals do not have 
clear notice as to what conduct qualifies as insider trading.29 
According to Pitt and Shapiro, securities regulators are inclined 
to proceed by enforcement actions because it is easier to bring an 
action retrospectively against specific acts than prospectively craft 
rules relating to a wide array of conduct. But “Regulation by 
Enforcement” raises concerns in that “notions of due process require 
ample, advance notification of precisely what types of conduct will be 
prohibited, before any person may be civilly or criminally prosecuted 
for a violation of those standards.”30 
The “Regulation by Enforcement” critique held up rulemaking 
as the ideal generator of norms governing the securities industry, 
explaining: 
[R]egulations prescribe, in advance of their application, normative 
standards of conduct to which persons subject to agency jurisdiction 
must adhere in the future. Enforcement powers apply existing rules 
to past facts, to assure compliance with regulatory standards, both 
by the entity subject to the standard (but accused of noncompliance) 
and by other entities similarly situated. In a proper context, an 
administrative agency should define normative standards first, offer 
interpretive guidance second (to the extent feasible), and compel 
obedience to those standards as a last resort, when it is clear that 
those standards have been well publicized and comprehended, but 
disregarded.31 
 
 25. Pitt & Shapiro, supra note 20, at 156. 
 26. See id. at 199–200. 
 27. See id. at 206–08 (analyzing the pitfalls of possible definitions). While making this 
observation, Pitt and Shapiro do not propose a definition. 
 28. See id. at 207–08. 
 29. Id. at 207. 
 30. Id. at 167 (emphasis omitted). 
 31. Id. 
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The “Regulation by Enforcement” critique reflects a general sense 
that norms are best initiated by rulemaking whereas enforcement 
actions should merely enact previously defined rules. 
There is evidence that the critique influenced SEC policy. After 
the early form of the critique, in the 1980s, the SEC shifted from 
prosecuting companies to focusing on insider trading, which involves 
wrongdoing by individuals rather than companies.32 This effort against 
insider trading in turn provoked Pitt and Shapiro’s “Regulation by 
Enforcement” critique, which was influential in the 1990s. A 2005 
study observes that prior to 2002, SEC enforcement actions tended to 
target companies with smaller market capitalization than did private 
plaintiffs.33 Even when it was given new statutory powers to seek civil 
monetary penalties in 1990,34 the SEC used the power sparingly over 
the next decade against public companies.35 This tendency might 
 
 32. See id. at 199–201 (describing insider trading as the “Centerpiece of the Enforcement 
Program of the 1980s” and observing that “[i]nsider trading cases provided a ready vehicle for 
pursuing individuals rather than issuers, since it was thought that, only in the rare case, if at all, 
would a company play a role in insider trading other than as the source or object of the 
information in question”). 
That is not to say that the SEC was not bringing enforcement actions during this period. 
Indeed, the SEC’s action against the NASD in 1996 for anticompetitive practices was a major 
principles-based enforcement action. JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL 
STREET: A HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION AND MODERN 
CORPORATE FINANCE 698–701 (3d ed. 2003). But it appears that for the most part, the focus 
was on areas directed at individuals or smaller firms such as “microcap or penny stock fraud and 
day trading abuses as well as traditional areas such as unregistered securities, financial fraud, 
and insider trading.” Id. at 638 (footnote omitted). 
 33. See James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Public and Private Enforcement of the 
Securities Laws: Have Things Changed Since Enron?, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 893, 897–98 
(2005). Post-2002, the study shows that the SEC has begun targeting much larger companies. Id. 
at 901–02. 
 34. Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 
101-429, 104 Stat. 931 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). Prior to this statute, the 
impact of enforcement actions was also limited by the remedies regulators had at their disposal. 
See, e.g., Pitt & Shapiro, supra note 20, at 295 (“Under the Commission’s old enforcement 
program, which emphasized injunctive relief, and permitted defendants to walk away from 
litigation by promising to do what the law already required those defendants to do (namely, to 
obey the law), without any acknowledgment of wrongdoing, the prospects of settlement were 
quite high.”); see also Cutler, supra note 16 (“[U]ntil very recently, the Commission necessarily 
relied almost exclusively on forward-looking relief, such as federal court injunctions, orders of 
disgorgement, and remedial undertakings such as procedural reforms and independent 
monitors, to enforce compliance with securities laws.”). 
 35. See Richard A. Spehr & Michelle J. Annunziata, The Remedies Act Turns Fifteen: What 
Is Its Relevance Today?, 1 N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS. 587, 596–97 (2005) (“It has been observed that in 
the decade or so following the enactment of the Remedies Act, the SEC did not often seek or 
obtain penalties against public companies.”); see also John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding Enron: 
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indicate that the SEC was focusing on unsophisticated individuals and 
smaller companies with problems complying with basic rules because 
they did not have the legal resources and reputational capital of 
larger companies. 
B. The Case of Regulation FD 
The influence of the “Regulation by Enforcement” critique is 
illustrated by the passage of Regulation FD (Fair Disclosure). In the 
late 1990s the SEC discovered that “many issuers [we]re disclosing 
important nonpublic information, such as advance warnings of 
earnings results, to securities analysts or selected institutional 
investors or both, before making full disclosure of the same 
information to the general public.”36 Such selective disclosure resulted 
in profitable trading on the information before it was released to the 
broader market. 
Selective disclosure was only arguably misconduct because 
although it implicates similar concerns as insider trading in that 
favored individuals were able to profit solely by virtue of their 
position, it was not entirely clear that it constituted insider trading 
under existing doctrine. Under a 1983 Supreme Court case, Dirks v. 
SEC,37 for insider trading liability to attach, the tipper (who 
disseminates the information) needs to breach a fiduciary duty, or 
obtain some kind of personal benefit or gain.38 A company, who is the 
tipper in this situation, does not gain in the same way as the 
paradigmatic corporate insider who reveals insider information in 
exchange for money or a share of the profits. A company, however, 
arguably gains from the selective disclosure of information because it 
strengthens relationships with analysts or investors who shape the 
public perception of the company. 
The SEC could have responded to the evidence of selective 
disclosure by bringing enforcement actions against the most egregious 
examples of such conduct and arguing for an extension of insider 
 
“It’s About the Gatekeepers, Stupid,” 57 BUS. LAW. 1403, 1409–10 & n.33 (2002) (noting that the 
SEC pursued individuals rather than the Big Five accounting firms during the 1990s); Cox & 
Thomas, supra note 33, at 897–98 (discussing the SEC’s tactics in using its expanded statutory 
powers). 
 36. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Securities Act Release No. 7881, Exchange 
Act Release No. 43,154, Investment Company Act Release No. 24,599, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,716, 
51,716 (Aug. 24, 2000) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 243, 249). 
 37. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983). 
 38. Id. at 661–62. 
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trading doctrine. Instead, it chose to address the problem through a 
process similar to that advanced by the proponents of the 
“Regulation by Enforcement” critique. It proposed and promulgated 
a rule prohibiting companies from intentionally disclosing nonpublic 
information to a select group of insiders without releasing it at the 
same time to the general public.39 SEC staff then made an effort to 
publicize the types of conduct it would be targeting.40 
In doing so, the SEC was clear that the “Regulation by 
Enforcement” critique was a factor in choosing a rulemaking 
approach. In the final rule release, it explained: 
  Some commenters contended that rulemaking on this topic was 
an inappropriately broad response to the issue. They suggested 
instead that we use existing tools (namely, the law of insider trading) 
to bring individual enforcement actions in those cases that appear to 
involve significant selective disclosures. While we have considered 
this approach . . . we do not agree that this is the appropriate 
response to the legal uncertainties posed by current insider trading 
law. In other contexts, we have been criticized for attempting to 
“make new law” in an uncertain area by means of enforcement 
action and urged instead to seek to change the law through notice-
and-comment rulemaking. We believe that this rulemaking is the 
more careful and considered response to the problem presented by 
selective disclosure.41 
The “Regulation by Enforcement” critique led the SEC to 
address the problem of selective disclosure through a new rule rather 
than enforcement actions. Thus, by the end of the 1990s, the 
“Regulation by Enforcement” critique had some influence. 
C. Rulemaking vs. Principles-Based Enforcement 
The “Regulation by Enforcement” critique implicitly assumes 
that rulemaking is more legitimate than enforcement and should 
 
 39. 17 C.F.R. §§ 243.100–.103 (2007). 
 40. Richard H. Walker, Dir., Div. of Enforcement, SEC: Regulation FD—An Enforcement 
Perspective (Nov. 1, 2000), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch415.htm. 
 41. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,718 (citations omitted). In 
a lecture panel presentation discussing Regulation FD, Harvey Goldschmid, who was General 
Counsel of the SEC when Regulation FD was first presented, noted that he believed that the 
SEC could have won an extension of Dirks so the insider trading laws would apply to issuers, 
but that litigation might have imposed too many costs and would have caused a chilling effect on 
corporate communications. Lecture: Panel Discussion: The SEC’s Regulation FD (Feb. 12, 
2001), in 6 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 273, 279–81 (2001). 
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necessarily precede it. In other words, enforcement should be limited 
to rules-based enforcement. But why is that necessarily so? The 
securities industry is governed not only by specific rules directed at 
specific conduct but general principles embodied in statutes and case 
law that are potentially applicable to a wide array of behavior.42 
Discussion of enforcement must also include principles-based 
enforcement. 
The law has long recognized the difference between rules, which 
are promulgated ex ante, and principles, which are defined ex post.43 
The distinction between rules and principles inherent in the securities 
regulatory regime was recognized as early as 1947 by the United 
States Supreme Court in its seminal administrative law decision, SEC 
v. Chenery Corp.44 In that case, the Supreme Court reviewed an SEC 
order relating to the reorganization of a public utility holding 
company. The SEC had taken the position that officers and directors 
of the company could not purchase preferred stock in the company 
during its reorganization to maintain management’s control. The SEC 
“felt that the officers and directors of a holding company in process of 
reorganization under the Act were fiduciaries and were under a duty 
not to trade in the securities of that company during the 
reorganization period.”45 The SEC’s original basis for its conclusion 
was that court cases imposed such a duty. But the Supreme Court 
disagreed, finding that neither the courts nor the SEC itself had 
imposed such a rule, and remanded the case.46 
 
 42. An example of a principle is the general prohibition against “manipulative or deceptive 
devices” and fraud set forth in section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 
10b-5. These provisions are intentionally broad and were described as “a ‘catchall’ clause to 
enable the Commission ‘to deal with new manipulative (or cunning) devices.’” Ernst & Ernst v. 
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 203 (1976) (quoting a statement of Thomas Corcoran in a hearing 
before the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce). 
 43. The law review literature often refers to the distinction between rules and standards. 
See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 559 
(1992) (“Arguments about and definitions of rules and standards commonly emphasize the 
distinction between whether the law is given content ex ante or ex post.”); Cass R. Sunstein, 
Problems with Rules, 83 CAL. L. REV. 953, 961 (1995) (“[W]e have a rule, or rule-ness, to the 
extent that decisions about cases have been made ex ante rather than ex post.”). When I use the 
word principles, I am essentially referring to standards. I use the word principles because much 
of the literature specific to the securities regulation refers to a distinction between rules and 
principles rather than rules and standards. See supra note 1. 
 44. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947). 
 45. Id. at 197. 
 46. Id. at 198. 
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On remand, the SEC issued a new order, coming to the same 
result but articulating a new reason, “that the proposed transaction is 
inconsistent with the standards of sections 7 and 11 of the [Public 
Utility Holding Company] Act.”47 In other words, the transaction 
violated a principle embodied in a statute. On appeal, management 
argued that the SEC did not have the power to apply what was 
essentially a new principle retroactively. They claimed that “the 
Commission would be free only to promulgate a general rule 
outlawing such profits in future utility reorganizations; but such a rule 
would have to be prospective in nature and have no retroactive effect 
upon the instant situation.”48 
The Supreme Court rejected this argument. It reasoned that 
although the SEC had the power to proceed by rulemaking, and 
should do so in most instances, to accept the management’s position 
would “stultify the administrative process.”49 It established that the 
SEC could implement legal norms not only through the rulemaking 
process, but also through principles-based enforcement, explaining: 
Not every principle essential to the effective administration of a 
statute can or should be cast immediately into the mold of a general 
rule. Some principles must await their own development, while 
others must be adjusted to meet particular, unforeseeable 
situations. . . . [A]n administrative agency must be equipped to act 
either by general rule or by individual order.50 
The Chenery Court observed that the choice of policymaking 
form was not dictated by any legal standard, but was largely within 
the discretion of the administrative agency.51 Although Chenery 
involved an agency adjudication, its reasoning that the SEC has wide 
discretion in the way it chooses to communicate legal norms applies 
equally to enforcement actions. 
Thus, there are two possible regulatory responses to arguable 
misconduct—rulemaking and principles-based enforcement. Part II 
tells the story of the reemergence of the latter approach. 
 
 47. Id. at 199. 
 48. Id. at 199–200. 
 49. Id. at 202. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 203 (“[T]he choice made between proceeding by general rule or by individual, ad 
hoc litigation is one that lies primarily in the informed discretion of the administrative 
agency.”). 
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II.  THE RESURGENCE OF PRINCIPLES-BASED ENFORCEMENT 
Just a few years after Regulation FD was passed, the securities 
industry faced major enforcement actions in three areas:  
(1) kickbacks in the Initial Public Offering (IPO) allocation process, 
(2) conflicts of interests affecting Wall Street research analysts, and 
(3) mutual funds that profited from market timing arrangements.52 All 
three involved examples of what I describe as arguable misconduct, 
instances in which the conduct was largely unregulated by rules but 
violated a broader principle. The prior ideal, in which rulemaking 
 
 52. See Cristie L. Ford, Toward a New Model for Securities Law Enforcement, 57 ADMIN. 
L. REV. 757, 766 (2005) (“The [SEC] Enforcement Division has filed an unprecedented number 
of actions, especially against organizations, in the last two years.”). In addition, the enforcement 
response to the corporate scandals that erupted in the early part of this century has included 
criminal prosecutions, private class actions, and civil regulatory enforcement actions. 
Prosecutors have won criminal convictions against high level executives of bankrupt companies 
who committed accounting fraud. See, e.g., John R. Emshwiller et al., Symbol of an Era: Lay, 
Skilling are Convicted of Fraud—Jurors Reject Defense Claim That Enron Was Clean; Question 
of Credibility—Two ‘Very Controlling People,’ WALL ST. J., May 26, 2006, at A1; Barry Meier, 2 
Guilty in Fraud at a Cable Giant, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 2004, at A1; Dionne Searcey et al., Ebbers 
is Sentenced to 25 Years for $11 Billion WorldCom Fraud, WALL ST. J., July 14, 2005 at A1. Class 
action plaintiffs have brought numerous suits and negotiated billions of dollars in settlements 
against the gatekeepers who should have detected such fraud. See, e.g., Robin Sidel, J.P. 
Morgan to Pay $2 Billion As Street’s Bill for Bubble Soars, WALL ST. J., Mar. 17, 2005, at A1; 
Randall Smith & Robin Sidel, J.P. Morgan Agrees To Settle IPO Case for $425 Million, WALL 
ST. J., Apr. 21, 2006, at C4; Jonathan Weil & Robin Sidel, WorldCom Investors Settle Lawsuits—
Investment Banks Will Pay Almost All of $651 Million in Pact Tied to Bond Deals, WALL ST. J., 
Oct. 27, 2005, at A3. 
While all three responses have had success, I would argue that civil regulatory 
enforcement actions have been the most instrumental in communicating legal norms to industry. 
Criminal law is limited by its stringent burden of proof and the collateral effects of corporate 
indictments. See, e.g., Ken Brown et al., Called to Account: Indictment of Andersen in Shredding 
Case Puts Its Future in Question—Obstruction of Justice Count May Speed the Departure of 
Clients and Partners—Firm Calls It ‘Death Penalty,’ WALL ST. J., Mar. 15, 2002, at A1. Private 
class actions focus on private interests and terms of settlements are often classified. See, e.g., 
Joseph A. Grundfest, Disimplying Private Rights of Action Under the Federal Securities Laws: 
The Commission’s Authority, 107 HARV. L. REV. 963, 1000 (1994) (“Although private claims 
play an undeniably important role in the enforcement of the securities laws, they are brought for 
entirely private ends. Private damages actions focus narrowly on how much the individual lost 
as a result of the illegal conduct and whether that injury can be reasonably quantified.” (quoting 
SEC v. Rind, 991 F.2d 1486, 1490 (9th Cir. 1993))). Because of their civil nature, enforcement 
actions do not suffer from the restrictions of criminal prosecutions. Because they are brought by 
government officials serving the public interest, they do not suffer from the same limits as 
private class actions. Through the use of subpoena power, the government can obtain evidence 
and craft complaints that are based on more than conjecture. The allegations can be widely 
publicized so that the precise evidence of wrongdoing and why it was wrong is communicated to 
the public. By doing so, the application of the legal norm can be communicated to industry with 
great speed. 
02__PARK.DOC 12/20/2007  10:10:17 AM 
2007] SECURITIES REGULATION 643 
preceded rules-based enforcement actions, was reversed in all three 
cases, in which principles-based enforcement actions preceded 
rulemaking. 
A. The IPO Cases 
The first example is the action by the SEC and NASD against 
Credit Suisse First Boston (CSFB) for abuses related to its allocation 
of IPO shares to brokerage customers.53 CSFB entered into quid pro 
quo arrangements with its customers where: (1) CSFB would provide 
a customer with shares in an IPO likely to immediately increase 
exponentially in price; and (2) the customer would funnel back a 
portion of its abnormally high IPO profits to CSFB by paying 
abnormally high rates for executing unrelated securities transactions.54 
1. The Market for “Hot IPOs.”  In an IPO, a company issues 
shares to the public for the first time.55 Typically, an investment bank 
will underwrite the deal, purchasing the shares from the issuer at a 
discount (usually 7 percent) and reselling the shares to the public.56 
The underwriter advises the issuer regarding marketing the IPO to 
investors and setting the initial price at which the IPO shares will be 
sold.57 Many underwriters have brokerage divisions that execute 
 
 53. CSFB Complaint, supra note 16, at paras. 1–2; see also SEC Sues CSFB for IPO 
Violations; CSFB Will Pay $100 Million, SEC Litigation Release No. 17327 (Jan. 22, 2002), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr17327.htm (discussing abuses relating to 
the allocation of IPO shares to brokerage customers). 
 54. CSFB Complaint, supra note 16, at paras. 1–2. 
 55. Id. at para. 8. 
 56. See In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 241 F. Supp. 2d 281, 293–94 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); 
Sean J. Griffith, Spinning and Underpricing: A Legal and Economic Analysis of the Preferential 
Allocation of Shares in Initial Public Offerings, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 583, 590–92 (2004). 
Typically, there is more than one investment bank involved in the deal. Most IPOs are 
“offered to the public through an ‘underwriting syndicate,’ a group of underwriters who agree to 
purchase the shares from the issuer and then sell the shares to investors.” SEC, Initial Public 
Offerings: Why Individuals Have Difficulty Getting Shares, Nov. 24, 1999, http://www.sec. 
gov/answers/ipodiff.htm [hereinafter SEC, Initial Public Offerings]; see also Billing v. Credit 
Suisse First Boston Ltd., 426 F.3d 130, 137–38 (2d Cir. 2005) (noting the risk management 
function of forming underwriting syndicates as well as syndicates’ prominence), rev’d on other 
grounds, 127 S. Ct. 2383 (2007) . 
 57. See generally NYSE/NASD IPO ADVISORY COMM., REPORT AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 4–5 (2003) (“We encourage underwriters to engage in an open discussion 
with the issuer’s pricing committee, explaining to the issuer the context and significance of 
indications of interest from various investors, as well as sharing their perspective on this 
demand.”). 
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equity transactions through which they can allocate the IPO shares.58 
Investors who receive allocations of IPO shares have the right to 
purchase the IPO shares at the initial offering price. 
When the demand for shares of an issuer is significantly greater 
than the supply, investors may be willing to pay substantially more for 
an IPO share than its initial price.59 Thus, the price of these shares can 
quickly rise.60 Investors who receive IPO allocations and purchase the 
stock at the initial offering price can make a substantial profit by 
immediately selling those shares in the secondary market.61 IPOs that 
immediately trade at a premium in the secondary market are known 
as “hot IPOs.”62 The late 1990s saw one of the most fervent “hot IPO” 
markets, especially with respect to IPOs by internet companies.63 
Investment banks allocate the bulk of IPO shares to large 
institutional clients such as mutual funds and hedge funds.64 Retail 
customers such as smaller institutions and individual investors find it 
more difficult to receive allocations because the main criteria for 
allocating IPO shares to investors is the amount of business the 
 
 58. See CSFB Complaint, supra note 16, at para. 11. 
 59. Studies show that this commonly occurs. See In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 241 
F. Supp. 2d at 300 (“For at least five decades, studies have shown that IPOs generally trade on 
the open market at a price significantly higher than the offering price, a phenomenon known as 
underpricing.”). 
 60. John C. Coffee, Jr., The IPO Investigations: Who’s the Victim? What’s the Harm?, 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/dotcon/crying/coffeeipos.html (last visited Nov. 
27, 2007) (“[P]rice spikes occur because the offering is oversubscribed—that is, the underwriters 
have solicited ‘indications of interest’ from potential buyers amounting to many times the 
number of shares that the issuer . . . wishes to sell.”). 
 61. See In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 241 F. Supp. 2d at 294; CSFB Complaint, 
supra note 16, at para. 17. 
 62. See Billing v. Credit Suisse First Boston Ltd., 426 F.3d 130, 139 n.7 (2d Cir. 2005), rev’d 
on other grounds, 127 S. Ct. 2383 (2007); CSFB Complaint, supra note 16, at para. 8; SEC, Initial 
Public Offerings, supra note 56 (“When an IPO is ‘hot,’ appealing to many investors, the 
demand for the securities far exceeds the supply of shares. The excess demand can only be 
satisfied once trading in the IPO shares begins.”). 
 63. See generally In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 241 F. Supp. 2d at 306 (“[T]he IPO 
market of 1998–2000 was more extraordinary than the previous three hot issues markets.”); 
NYSE/NASD IPO ADVISORY COMM., supra note 57, at 1, 4 (noting that the late 1990s was “a 
period in which an unusually large number of offerings traded at extraordinary and immediate 
aftermarket premiums”). IPO shares would frequently double or triple in price on the first day 
of trading. For example, shares of the company VA Linux rose from an initial offering price of 
$30 to $239 in the first day of trading, an increase of 697 percent. See CSFB Complaint, supra 
note 16, at para. 54. Of course, there is no guarantee that over time the initial rise in price is 
sustainable. See, e.g., Howard Schilit, FINANCIAL SHENANIGANS 104–08 (2d ed. 2002) 
(describing collapse of Boston Chicken stock after a successful IPO). 
 64. See CSFB Complaint, supra note 16, at para. 15. 
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investor conducts with the brokerage division of the investment 
bank.65 Broker-dealers earn much of their revenue by charging a 
commission for executing securities transactions. Typically, for 
institutions, the commission rate for an equity transaction is $0.06 per 
share.66 Large institutions managing billions of dollars have the ability 
to generate more for the broker-dealers in commissions from 
securities transactions than do individual investors with small 
portfolios.67 
2. The Enforcement Action against Credit Suisse First Boston.  
In 1999, CSFB managed more domestic IPOs than any other U.S. 
investment bank.68 As a result, it had access to a large number of “hot 
IPOs” that it allocated to favored customers. CSFB entered into 
explicit arrangements with certain customers allowing it to capture a 
part of the “hot IPO” profits.69 In return for allocations in a “hot 
IPO,” the customer would agree to funnel back as much as 65 percent 
of its IPO profits to CSFB.70 Customers repaid IPO profits by 
generating commissions on unrelated securities transactions.71 On the 
days around an IPO, the customer would buy highly liquid securities, 
such as shares in IBM or Procter & Gamble, through CSFB’s 
brokerage division. Instead of paying the normal $0.06 per share 
commission on these transactions, the customer would pay 
commissions as high as $3.15 per share on the transaction. The 
 
 65. Id. at para. 13; see also Arthur Levitt, Chairman, SEC, Speech at the Los Angeles 
Times Fourth Annual Investment Strategies Conference: Investing with Your Eyes Open (Feb. 
12, 2000), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch345.htm (“Shares often are allocated 
according to business relationships and other subjective criteria.”). 
 66. See CSFB Complaint, supra note 16, at para. 46. This commission covers the cost of 
execution and the value of advice and other services such as research provided by the broker-
dealer. 
 67. Coffee, supra note 60 (“[L]arge institutional investors implicitly pay for receiving 
priority in the allocation of ‘hot’ offerings by directing their brokerage business to the major 
underwriters. . . . [A large mutual fund] could direct this brokerage business to a cheap discount 
broker, or it could negotiate a somewhat higher commission rate with a broker dealer that was 
also a major underwriter in return for a priority in the latter’s IPO allocations.”); see also 
Jonathan Reuter, Are IPO Allocations for Sale? Evidence from Mutual Funds, 61 J. OF FIN. 
2289, 2290, 2322 (2006) (finding that underwriters allocate based on amount of overall 
“brokerage business”). 
 68. News Release, NASD Regulation, Inc., Statement of Mary Schapiro on Announcement 
of CSFB Action (Jan. 22, 2002), available at http://www.finra.org/PressRoom/NewsReleases/ 
2002NewsReleases/P002966. 
 69. CSFB Complaint, supra note 16, at paras. 19–20. 
 70. Id. at paras. 42–43. 
 71. Id. at paras. 21–22. 
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customer would then sell the securities through another broker-
dealer, paying the normal $0.06 per share commission.72 
The scheme involved entities too small to generate the 
commission business needed to receive an IPO allocation.73 Thus, 
most of the customers paid the commissions willingly, because while 
they had to return a portion of their profits, they still earned a 
substantial profit on the transaction.74 
In December 2000, after reports in the Wall Street Journal noted 
unusual commission activity on the days before and after many IPOs, 
regulators began investigating CSFB’s IPO allocation practices.75 On 
January 22, 2002, the SEC and NASD announced a settlement with 
CSFB.76 The primary substantive count alleged was a violation of 
NASD Rule 2330(f), which prohibits brokers from sharing in the 
profits of their customers.77 CSFB’s conduct was also alleged to 
violate NASD Rule 2110, which requires brokers to comport with 
high standards of commercial honor, a standard charge in NASD 
actions.78 CSFB agreed to pay $70 million in disgorgement, pay a $30 
million penalty, implement policies and procedures governing IPO 
 
 72. Id. at para. 22. 
 73. Id. at para. 2. 
 74. Id. at para. 20. 
 75. See Susan Pulliam et al., Coming to Terms: CSFB Agrees to Pay $100 Million to Settle 
Twin IPO Investigations—Probes by SEC and NASD Grew out of Conduct During Dot-Com 
Frenzy—A Legacy of Wheat’s Reign, WALL ST. J., Dec. 11, 2001, at A1 (“Investigators began 
focusing last year on CSFB’s alleged practice of awarding shares of hot IPOs to some investors 
who agreed to pay the firm large commissions on other transactions. As detailed in a series of 
Wall Street Journal stories beginning in December 2000, some of these commissions came on 
big batches of trades at hugely inflated rates.”). 
 76. SEC Sues CSFB for IPO Violations; CSFB Will Pay $100 Million, supra note 53; News 
Release, NASD Regulation, Inc., supra note 68. 
 77. See CSFB Complaint, supra note 16, at paras. 74–75. NASD Rule 2330(f) provides in 
relevant part: 
[N]o member or person associated with a member shall share directly or indirectly in 
the profits or losses in any account of a customer carried by the member or any other 
member; provided, however, that a member or person associated with a member may 
share in the profits or losses in such an account if (i) such person associated with a 
member obtains prior written authorization from the member employing the 
associated person; (ii) such member or person associated with a member obtains prior 
written authorization from the customer; and (iii) such member or person associated 
with a member shares in the profits or losses in any account of such customer only in 
direct proportion to the financial contributions made to such account by either the 
member or person associated with a member. 
Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, NASD Manual, Rules of the Association, Rule 2330(f)(1)(A), 
http://finra.complinet.com/finra/index.html (last visited Nov. 27, 2007). 
 78. CSFB Complaint, supra note 16, at paras. 70–72. 
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allocations, and hire an independent consultant to monitor its 
compliance with the settlement.79 
3. Lack of Regulation.  The CSFB IPO case broke new ground. 
Prior to the CSFB case, the SEC’s position was that underwriters 
could allocate IPO shares however they wanted to their customers.80 
As it had explained to investors in a release: “The underwriters and 
the company that issues the shares control the IPO process. They 
have wide latitude in allocating IPO shares. The SEC does not 
regulate the business decision of how IPO shares are allocated.”81 The 
SEC Chairman, Arthur Levitt, approved of allocating “hot IPOs” to 
customers who generated the most commission business, calling it a 
“good business practice, in the same way that an automobile dealer 
will allocate the first new, highly desired car to a customer that had 
been with them for a period of time.”82 The SEC and NASD had 
investigated the practice of allocating “hot IPO” shares to top 
executives in 1997 but brought no action.83 
The SEC’s citation of NASD Rule 2330(f) in the CSFB case was 
not the simple application of a rule.84 As reported by the Wall Street 
 
 79. See SEC v. Credit Suisse First Boston Corp., No. 1: 02-00090-RWR, 2002 WL 479836, 
at *2 (D.D.C. Jan. 29, 2002). 
 80. NASD rules prohibit underwriters from allocating IPO shares to themselves, relatives, 
or to accounts where they have a “beneficial interest.” Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, NASD 
Manual, Rules of the Association, Rule 2790, http://finra.complinet.com/finra/index.html (last 
visited Nov. 27, 2007). 
 81. SEC, Initial Public Offerings, supra note 56; see also John C. Coffee, The SEC’s IPO 
Probe, NAT’L L.J., July 9, 2001, at B8 (“No duty to prorate IPO stock among all customers, or to 
otherwise apportion it ‘fairly’ has ever been recognized within the industry.”); SEC, Allocation 
of New Issues of Securities, 1994 WL 744595, at *1 (Oct. 18, 1994) (“Broker-dealers are free to 
establish their own procedures and priorities for allocating new shares to investors, as long as 
the allocation is not conducted in a fraudulent or manipulative manner and is consistent with 
the rules of the broker-dealers’ self-regulatory organization (SRO). . . . None of the SROs, 
however, prescribe procedures that broker-dealers must use to allocate offering securities 
among their customers.”). 
 82. Interview by Martin Smith with Arthur Levitt, Former Chairman, SEC (May 2001), 
available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/dotcon/interviews/levitt.html; see 
also Levitt, supra note 65 (“Shares often are allocated according to business relationships and 
other subjective criteria.”). 
 83. See Randall Smith, NASD Proposes Tougher Rules on IPO Abuses—Agency Would 
Bar Brokers from Allocating Hot Issues To Curry Favor with Clients, WALL ST. J., July 29, 2002, 
at A1 (“Although both the SEC and NASD investigated spinning [in response to a 1997 Wall 
Street Journal article], neither agency brought a case against any major firm.”). 
 84. NASD Rule 2330(f) provides: “Except as provided in paragraph (f)(2) no member or 
person associated with a member shall share directly or indirectly in the profits or losses in any 
account of a customer carried by the member or any other member . . . .” Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. 
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Journal, there was internal dissension among regulators about what 
rule to apply.85 NASD Rule 2330(f) had not been understood as 
regulating IPO allocation decisions. Although CSFB’s conduct fell 
within NASD Rule 2330(f) in a literal sense in that CSFB was 
requiring customers to share their guaranteed IPO profits by 
returning part of the profits through excessive commissions, it did not 
fall within the original purpose of that rule, which was to protect 
retail customers from conflicts of interest that could arise when 
brokers had an interest in their investments.86 In contrast, unlike the 
typical NASD Rule 2330(f) case, CSFB involved sophisticated 
customers who knew exactly what they were doing. Even with the 
requirement to pay back a portion of the profits, they knew they 
would receive a substantial return with little or no risk.87 
4. The Commercial Bribery Principle.  A more convincing 
theory is that CSFB’s quid pro quo arrangements with its customers 
violated a principle against commercial bribery,88 which reflects the 
 
Dealers, NASD Manual, Rules of the Association, Rule 2330(f)(1)(A), http://finra.complinet. 
com/finra/index.html (last visited Nov. 27, 2007). 
 85. See Pulliam et al., supra note 75 (“In the CSFB case, the regulators have struggled with 
what law to apply to the firm’s practices.”). 
Early speculation had been that the conduct could violate other rules such as the Free-
riding and Withholding Rules or bans against undisclosed underwriting compensation. See 
Susan Pulliam & Randall Smith, Two at CSFB Put on Leave amid IPO Probe—Action Shows 
Inquiry Touches Tech Team of Frank Quattrone, WALL ST. J., Apr. 20, 2001, at C1. 
 86. NASD Rule 2330(f) was modeled after section 205 of the Investment Advisers Act, 
which also prohibits certain profit sharing arrangements. See NASD Notice to Members 01-24: 
SEC Approves Proposed Rule Changes to Rule 2330(f)(2) Relating to Performance Fees (Apr. 
2001), available at http://www.finra.org/web/groups/rules_regs/documents/notice_to_members/ 
p003885.pdf. The legislative history of Section 205 indicates that the rationale for the 
prohibition against profit sharing was the concern that customers would be harmed if advisers 
had an incentive to make risky investments in hopes of a larger fee. See Exemption To Allow 
Registered Investment Advisors to Charge Fees Based Upon a Share of Capital Gains Upon or 
Capital Appreciation of a Client’s Account, 50 Fed. Reg. 48,556, 48,557 (Nov. 26, 1985) 
(“Congress enacted the prohibition of Section 205(1) against performance fees in 1940 to 
protect clients of investment advisers from fee arrangements which in Congress’ view could 
encourage advisers to engage in speculative trading practices while managing client funds in 
order to realize or increase an advisory fee.”). 
 87. See Coffee, supra note 81. 
 88. See The Impact of the Global Settlement: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, 
Housing, and Urban Affairs, 108th Cong. 44 (2003) (statement of Robert E. Glauber, Chairman 
and CEO, National Association of Securities Dealers) (describing enforcement actions as 
underscoring the principle “that hot IPOs cannot be doled out to corporate insiders as virtual 
commercial bribes”). 
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public importance of markets that function without kickbacks.89 By 
paying commission rates greater than the market price, CSFB’s 
customers were essentially paying kickbacks or commercial bribes in 
return for IPO allocations. In another sense, CSFB was bribing its 
customers through IPO allocations to pay greater than market prices 
for its brokerage services. Although commercial bribery is not 
specifically prohibited by NASD Rules, NASD Rule 2110 sets forth a 
general principle that broker-dealers are required to “observe high 
standards of commercial honor and just and equitable principles of 
trade” in the “conduct of [their] business.”90 Given that commercial 
bribery is widely prohibited by other statutes,91 it follows that bribery 
would violate “high standards of commercial honor and just and 
equitable principles of trade.” 
One objection to this theory is that there is no substantial 
difference between a smaller customer paying above-market 
commissions to obtain IPO allocations and larger customers obtaining 
IPO allocations by directing a large volume of trades at market prices. 
Both are attempting to pay something to get something.92 But the 
quid pro quo agreements found in the investigation of CSFB made it 
clear that the allocations were not based on the status of the customer 
but instead were part of an explicit kickback arrangement. Moreover, 
the excessive commissions paid by CSFB customers did not reflect the 
purchase of legitimate services. Under Section 28(e) of the Securities 
Exchange Act, an investment manager may lawfully pay a 
commission higher than the market commission rate only “if such 
person determined in good faith that such amount of commission was 
reasonable in relation to the value of the brokerage and research 
services provided.”93 The commissions in the CSFB case were so 
 
 89. See generally 12 AM. JUR. 2D Bribery § 1 (2007) (“[B]ribery is the criminal offense of 
offering, giving, soliciting, accepting, or agreeing to accept something of value with an intent to 
corruptly influence the action of . . . an employee of a private business . . . . The purpose of 
bribery is to cause certain matters that should be decided or handled in an objective way to be 
decided or handled in the private interest of the bribegiver or the bribetaker. It is something 
that directly affects the community at large. It offends the public sense of decency and tends to 
pervert justice.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 90. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, NASD Manual, Rules of the Association, Rule 2110, 
http://finra.complinet.com/finra/index.html (last visited Oct. 12, 2007). 
 91. See generally D.E. Ytreberg, Annotation, Validity and Construction of Statutes 
Punishing Commercial Bribery, 1 A.L.R.3d 1350 (1965) (collecting state and federal commercial 
bribery statutes). 
 92. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 81. 
 93. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 28(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(e) (2000). 
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excessive that they could not have been for legitimate brokerage and 
research services.94 
In essence, the CSFB case established that allocations of “hot 
IPO” shares should not be used as commercial bribes. This general 
principle was then extended to question a number of different IPO 
allocation practices through rulemaking and enforcement.95 After the 
CSFB case, practices such as “spinning,” in which “hot IPO” shares 
were allocated to company officers and directors in exchange for 
investment banking business,96 and “laddering,” in which “hot IPO” 
shares were allocated in exchange for an agreement to purchase 
additional shares of the IPO in the aftermarket, were closely 
scrutinized.97 For example, the New York Attorney General brought 
suit against directors of WorldCom for their involvement in 
 
 94. Indeed, the typical market commission of $0.06 per share already includes an extra 
payment for research and other services. Thus, payments of $1.00 per share go far beyond the 
industry standard for a reasonable commission. 
 95. On July 25, 2002, the NASD proposed conduct rules regulating IPO abuses. News 
Release, Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, NASD Board Approves Proposed Conduct Rules for IPO 
Activities (July 25, 2002), available at http://www.finra.org/PressRoom/NewsReleases/2002News 
Releases/P002921. It proposed explicitly prohibiting the quid pro quo arrangements at issue in 
the CSFB case as well as “spinning” and “laddering.” Id. In August 2002, at the request of the 
SEC Commissioner, the NYSE and NASD formed the NYSE/NASD IPO Advisory Committee 
to study the IPO process. See NYSE/NASD IPO ADVISORY COMM., supra note 57, at app. A. 
In May 2003, the NYSE/NASD IPO Advisory Committee published its report, recommending 
various measures to improve the transparency of the IPO process, including the prohibition of 
laddering, spinning, and quid pro quo arrangements. Id. at 10–13. 
In addition to these structural reform proposals, the CSFB investigation was followed by 
a number of enforcement actions against other market participants. See, e.g., SEC Sues J.P. 
Morgan Securities Inc. for Unlawful IPO Allocation Practices; J.P. Morgan Agrees to 
Settlement Calling for Injunction and Payment of $25 Million Penalty, SEC Litigation Release 
No. 18385 (Oct. 1, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr18385.htm; SEC 
Sues Robertson Stephens, Inc. for Profit Sharing in Connection with Initial Public Offerings; 
Robertson Stephens Consents to Pay $28 Million, SEC Litigation Release No. 17923 (Jan. 9, 
2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr17923.htm; News Release, Nat’l 
Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, NASD Fines J.P. Morgan for Sharing in Profits from Hot IPOs (Feb. 20, 
2003), available at http://www.finra.org/PressRoom/NewsReleases/2003NewsReleases/P002951; 
News Release, Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, NASD Sanctions Investment Banks for IPO 
Violations: Bear Stearns, Deutsche Bank and Morgan Stanley to Pay Over $15 Million (May 18, 
2004), available at http://www.finra.org/PressRoom/NewsReleases/2004NewsReleases/P002829. 
 96. Cf. Griffith, supra note 56, at 623–30, 637–43 (discussing the hypothesis that spinning 
“may amount to a quid pro quo arrangement, according to which the managers accept the 
benefit of the allocation in exchange for the underpricing of their company’s offering”). 
 97. See, e.g., Billing v. Credit Suisse First Boston Ltd., 426 F.3d 130, 144 (2d Cir. 2005) 
(“The purported ‘bribes’ consisted of underwriter promises to make ‘exceptionally large’ 
allocations of IPO securities in return for the institutional defendants’ promises to comply with 
the rules set by the underwriter defendants for the resale of the securities and to divide profits 
with them.”), rev’d on other grounds, 127 S. Ct. 2383 (2007). 
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“spinning.” In February 2006, a New York state court ruled that 
“spinning” was “merely a somewhat sophisticated form of bribery.”98 
Through the CSFB case, securities regulators asserted a principle 
against commercial bribery that was extended to other practices. 
B. The Research Analyst Cases 
A second example is the enforcement action initiated by the New 
York Attorney General targeting the practices of Wall Street 
research analysts. To win investment banking business, research 
analysts knowingly issued false opinions in their research reports and 
recommendations. The investigation of these practices established 
that these research recommendations were violating the anti-fraud 
principle. 
1. The Merging of Research and Investment Banking.  Research 
analysts grade public companies. They analyze the financials of a 
company, speak to management, interview customers, and form an 
opinion about the company’s future prospects.99 This opinion is often 
expressed through a scale of recommendations to buy, hold, or sell 
the stock.100 These opinions, predictions, and their bases are published 
in research reports that are distributed to investors and can influence 
the price of a stock.101 
Most investment banks do not directly charge for research. Part 
of the commission clients pay for execution of equity transactions is 
understood as paying for research.102 As competition among 
brokerage firms increased, commission rates went down and the 
revenue generated by analysts declined. As a result, research analysts 
began serving the needs of investment bankers because of their 
inability to generate revenue independently.103 At the same time, the 
 
 98. State of New York v. McLeod, No. 403855/02, 2006 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 1227, at *2 (Sup. 
Ct. Feb. 9, 2006). 
 99. See, e.g., Complaint at paras. 15–17, SEC v. J.P. Morgan Sec. Inc. 03 Civ. 2939, 
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 28, 2003); SEC, Investor Alert: Analyzing Analyst Recommendations, Apr. 20, 
2005, http://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/analysts.htm. 
 100. See SEC, supra note 99. 
 101. See id. 
 102. This is permissible under section 28(e) of the Securities Exchange Act. See Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 § 28(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(e) (2000). 
 103. See Complaint at para. 18, SEC v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc., 03 CV 
2941 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 28, 2003); Jonathan R. Macey, Positive Political Theory and Federal 
Usurption of the Regulation of Corporate Governance: The Coming Preemption of the Martin 
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investment banking business became much more competitive as the 
dominance of a few elite firms offering investment banking services 
waned.104 Competition became especially intense to be the lead 
underwriter who runs the securities offering, receives the greatest 
portion of fees, and is in charge of allocating IPO shares.105 
To distinguish themselves from their competitors, investment 
banks began using research coverage to obtain underwriting business. 
A credible research analyst might be an attractive reason for an issuer 
to choose the investment bank as lead underwriter.106 A favorable 
report by a research analyst gives credibility to a new company that is 
 
Act, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 951, 971 (2005) (“In response to complaints that brokerage 
commissions had sunk so low that brokers could no longer afford to pay analysts, analysts 
became more involved in marketing IPOs in order to justify their retention by investment 
banks.”). 
 104. See DAN REINGOLD, CONFESSIONS OF A WALL STREET ANALYST 36 (2006). Reingold 
describes 
the end of the genteel old world of banking, in which belonging to the same country 
club and living in the same town was as much of a draw for a corporate executive 
choosing a banker as the actual services the bank was offering. As banking became 
more competitive, these relationships weren’t enough anymore. Banks needed to 
offer something extra, some special sauce. As time went on, that special sauce would 
often involve bullish research. 
Id. 
 105. See, e.g., Complaint at para. 17, SEC v. U.S. Bancorp Piper Jaffray Inc., 03 Civ. 2942 
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 28, 2003) [hereinafter U.S. Bancorp Complaint]; Complaint at para. 15, SEC v. 
Morgan Stanley & Co., 03 Civ. 2948, (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 28, 2003) [hereinafter Morgan Stanley 
Complaint] (“Morgan Stanley typically competed with other investment banks for selection as 
the lead underwriter, or ‘bookrunner,’ for securities offerings, including IPOs and follow-on 
offerings. . . . Sole or joint bookrunners generally received the largest portion of underwriting 
fees, which were typically divided among the participating investment banks. The bookrunner 
also established the allocation of shares in an offering and typically retained the greatest 
number of shares for itself. The typical IPO generated millions of dollars in investment banking 
fees for the bookrunner.”). 
 106. See Morgan Stanley Complaint, supra note 105, at para. 16 (“In selecting the lead 
underwriters, issuers assessed a host of factors, including the strength and quality of the 
bankers’ research coverage. Issuers sought research coverage of their stocks, believing such 
coverage would enhance the credibility of their businesses, potentially lead to higher stock 
prices, and increase their exposure to the investing public.”); REINGOLD, supra note 104, at 75 
(“[A] bank’s research analyst was beginning to be one of the most important factors 
determining which investment banks companies and countries chose to handle their deals.”); Jill 
E. Fisch, Regulatory Responses to Investor Irrationality: The Case of the Research Analyst, 10 
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 58, 63–64 (“In the late 1990s, Wall Street research analysts were 
powerful and influential. . . . The ability of an investment bank’s research department to 
influence investor sentiment was a key factor in the bank’s ability to attract underwriting 
business.”). 
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entering the public markets for the first time and could increase the 
initial price at which its stock trades.107 
2. The New York Attorney General’s Investigation of Merrill 
Lynch.  In June 2001, the New York Attorney General began an 
investigation of all stock recommendations made by Merrill Lynch 
internet research analysts.108 On April 8, 2002, a New York state court 
granted the New York Attorney General’s motion for a preliminary 
injunction against Merrill Lynch.109 The motion contained e-mail 
evidence that Merrill Lynch research analysts had secretly denigrated 
stocks they recommended to the public. 
In essence, the motion alleged that analysts publicly 
recommended stocks while privately expressing negative opinions 
about those stocks.110 They did so because they were pressured by 
investment bankers and issuers to alter their reports.111 There was 
pressure because Merrill Lynch used the implicit promise of favorable 
ratings from a high-profile analyst to obtain investment banking 
business.112 Research analysts were motivated to give in because their 
compensation depended upon the amount of investment banking 
revenue they helped bring in.113 
The New York Attorney General’s action alleged violations of 
New York’s securities anti-fraud statute, the Martin Act.114 In May 
2002, Merrill Lynch agreed to settle the case for a $100 million fine 
 
 107. Interview by Martin Smith with Arthur Levitt, supra note 82 (“When fixed 
commissions were eliminated [in 1975], more and more of Wall Street’s profits had to come 
from investment banking. But what is the very best way to get investment banking business? 
The language of Wall Street is, ‘We’ll get you coverage.’ And what kind of coverage does that 
mean? An overwhelming number of research reports written about investment banking clients 
are favorable.”). 
 108. See Dinallo Aff., supra note 16, at 2. 
 109. See In re Spitzer v. Merrill Lynch & Co., No. 02-401522 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr. 8, 2002) 
(order granting a preliminary injunction). 
 110. See Dinallo Aff., supra note 16, at 13 (detailing in a chart instances in which public 
rating diverged from private comments). 
 111. See id. at 17, 20–23 (“Investment banking also was involved in criticizing and editing 
the internet group’s reports for client companies, opining on whether a particular rating would 
be acceptable and, in at least one instance, apparently opposing a proposed rating.”). 
 112. See id. at 15–17. 
 113. See id. at 20–21. 
 114. See Martin Act, N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 352 et seq. (McKinney 2006); Affidavit of Eric 
R. Dinallo, supra note 16, at 35–37. 
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and take steps to better manage the relationship between investment 
banking and research.115 
3. Lack of Regulation.  Prior to the New York Attorney 
General’s action, it was widely known among sophisticated investors 
that investment banks were using research analysts to generate 
investment banking business.116 As early as 1996, academic studies and 
the media noted that this was a conflict of interest that led to biased 
reports.117 Yet regulators did little to address the problems. There 
were no SEC, NASD, or NYSE rules directly regulating the 
relationship between investment bankers and research analysts.118 As 
the SEC chief of enforcement commented in a Wall Street Journal 
article on conflicts of interest relating to research analysts in 1997, 
“There are no hard and fast federal laws that say you can do this and 
you can’t do this . . . . It really is a question of navigating the problem 
case by case.”119 Moreover, an SEC no-action letter in 1997 allowed 
Merrill Lynch’s research analysts to comment on deals in which 
Merrill Lynch was the investment banker,120 implicitly legitimizing the 
interaction between research and banking. 
 
 115. See Charles Gasparino, Merrill Lynch to Pay Big Fine, Increase Oversight of Analysts—
New York Attorney General Wins $100 Million Penalty; E-mails Exposed Research, WALL ST. J., 
May 22, 2002, at A1. 
 116. See Barbara Moses, They Were Shocked, Shocked: The “Discovery” of Analyst 
Conflicts on Wall Street, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 89, 91 (2004) (“[T]he basic facts ‘discovered’ by 
Eliot Spitzer, by other regulators, and ultimately by the plaintiffs’ bar after the collapse of the 
Internet bubble were actually well known to sophisticated market participants throughout the 
1990s.”). Indeed as early as 1992, the Wall Street Journal published an article describing one 
investment bank’s policy that research analysts not make negative comments about investment 
banking clients. See Michael Siconolfi, At Morgan Stanley, Analysts Were Urged to Soften Harsh 
Views, WALL ST. J., July 14, 1992, at A1. 
 117. See, e.g., In re Merrill Lynch & Co. Research Reports Sec. Litig., 273 F. Supp. 2d 351, 
383–88 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (collecting examples of news stories describing analyst conflicts of 
interest); Wall Street Has an Unlikely New Cop: Spitzer—State Office, Used to Policing Junk 
Mail, Finds Fertile Ground in Stock Research, WALL ST. J., Apr. 25, 2002, at C1 (“For years, 
newspaper articles have detailed how Wall Street firms provided overly optimistic research 
about companies that were investment banking clients, he noted, but there was no serious effort 
by regulators to address this issue.”). 
 118. See Robert A. Prentice, The Inevitability of a Strong SEC, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 775, 
790 (2006) (“For various reasons, courts and commentators were hostile to SEC regulation of 
securities analysts, who remained relatively unregulated until recently.”). 
 119. Anita Raghavan, Jack of All Trades: How One Top Analyst Vaults ‘Chinese Wall’ To 
Do Deals for Firm—For Salomon, Grubman is Big Telecom Rainmaker; Investors Heed Him, 
Too—A Role That’s Hard to Police, WALL ST. J., Mar. 25, 1997, at A1. 
 120. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1997 SEC No-
Act. LEXIS 1014, at *4 (Oct. 21, 1997). 
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The sentiment may have been that the problem could be solved 
through rulemaking. In 1999, two years before the New York 
Attorney General’s suit, the SEC’s Division of Market Regulation 
began reviewing the research analyst industry for conflicts of 
interest.121 In testimony before Congress in 2001, almost a year before 
the Attorney General filed suit, the acting SEC Chairman reported 
with respect to the results of this review: “I recently called on the 
industry to take an active role in dealing with these and other 
problems surrounding analysts’ conflicts of interest. . . . [T]he 
industry, as well as the self-regulatory organizations (SROs) have 
heard this call to action.”122 The SEC initiated rulemaking on the 
issue.123 
4. The Anti-Fraud Principle.  Rather than deferring to the 
SEC’s rulemaking approach for managing conflicts of interest, the 
New York Attorney General issued subpoenas and initiated an 
investigation of research analyst practices. That investigation 
uncovered evidence of specific fraud by a high-profile research 
analyst at a premier firm.124 
In essence, fraud is a knowing misrepresentation made to induce 
action by an individual who suffers harm as a result of relying on that 
misrepresentation.125 The evidence uncovered by the New York 
 
 121. Lori Richards, Dir., Office of Compliance Inspections & Examinations, SEC, Speech to 
the Fin. Women’s Ass’n: Analysts Conflicts of Interest: Taking Steps to Remove Bias (May 8, 
2002), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch559.htm. 
 122. Analyzing the Analysts: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Capital Markets, Insurance, 
and Government Sponsored Enterprises of the H. Comm. on Financial Services, 107th Cong. 228, 
229 (2001) (written statement of Laura S. Unger, acting chair, SEC). 
 123. See Gasperino & Schroeder, supra note 13 (“The SEC chairman believed that the 
solution to the problem was developing a new set of national standards for analysts, while at the 
same time directing self-regulatory organizations, such as the National Association of Securities 
Dealers and the New York Stock Exchange, to examine conflicts of interest and draw up new 
rules on analyst compensation and disclosure practices.”). 
 124. See Dinallo Aff., supra note 16, at 36. 
 125. See Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341–42 (2005). The New York 
Attorney General investigates and prosecutes fraud based on a broadly worded New York State 
statute called the Martin Act. Martin Act, N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW, § 352 et seq. (McKinney 2006). 
While the Martin Act is a broad statute, it basically covers the same type of fraud prohibited by 
the federal securities laws. However, there are differences between the two statutory regimes. 
Federal securities law requires the showing of scienter or proof that the misrepresentation was 
made knowingly. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 212 (1976). In contrast, the 
Martin Act does not require such a showing. See People v. Federated Radio Corp., 154 N.E.  
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Attorney General left little doubt that at least some research analysts 
were knowingly making misrepresentations to the public. Analysts 
made positive comments about companies in their research reports, 
recommending that the public buy stock in the companies, while 
secretly recognizing that the stocks they were recommending were of 
poor quality. Even general statements of belief can be actionable as 
fraudulent if they are known to be false.126 Because research reports 
are widely disseminated to the public, and used by investment 
advisers to recommend stocks to investors, the analyst 
recommendations were made with the purpose of inducing reliance. 
As a result of their reliance on false recommendations, investors who 
purchased stock in companies that later declined substantially in 
value were damaged. 
This clear violation of the basic anti-fraud principle in a high-
profile case trumped the lack of precise rules governing research 
analysts. The result was a remarkable and monumental shift in the 
relationship between investment bankers and research analysts. The 
SEC followed the New York Attorney General’s lead and brought 
principles-based enforcement actions against Merrill Lynch and other 
companies.127 The Merrill Lynch case also led regulators to 
promulgate rules regulating the relationship between research 
analysts and investment bankers.128 Ultimately, it resulted in the 
separation of investment banking and research among major Wall 
 
655, 658 (N.Y. 1926). In the Merrill Lynch case, while the case was brought under the broader 
state statute, it appears the scienter requirement was met. 
The Martin Act was enacted by the New York State Legislature in 1921, giving the 
Attorney General the power to investigate securities transactions and seek injunctive relief. Act 
of May 7, 1921, 1921 N.Y. Laws 1989. In 1955, the New York State Legislature added section 
352-c to the Martin Act, giving the Attorney General the power to seek criminal indictments in 
securities fraud cases. Act of Apr. 21, 1955, 1955 N.Y. Laws 1255. 
 126. See Va. Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1095 (1991). 
 127. E.g., SEC v. Merrill Lynch & Co., SEC Litigation Release No. 18083, Accounting and 
Auditing Enforcement Release No. 1742 (Mar. 17, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/ 
litigation/litreleases/lr18038.htm. 
 128. On May 8, 2002, the SEC approved rules proposed in February 2002 by the NASD 
meant to regulate the relationship between research and investment banking. News Release, 
Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, Statement of NASD Chairmen and CEO Robert R. Glauber 
Regarding SEC Approval of New Analyst Rules (May 8, 2002), available at http://www. 
finra.org/PressRoom/NewsReleases/2002NewsReleases/P002935. On October 3, 2002, the 
NYSE and NASD proposed additional rules relating to research analysts and the formation of a 
committee to investigate practices relating to IPOs. See News Release, Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. 
Dealers and N.Y. Stock Exch., NYSE, NASD Move to Strengthen Rules Concerning Analysts, 
IPOs Both Efforts In Support of Joint Effort with SEC, NY Attorney General (Oct. 3, 2002), 
available at http://www.finra.org/PressRoom/NewsReleases/2002NewsReleases/P002895. 
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Street firms129 as well as the payment of a record settlement of $1.4 
billion.130 
C. The Mutual Fund Cases 
The final example is the New York Attorney General’s 
investigation of the mutual fund industry. Mutual funds entered into 
arrangements with hedge funds in which they exchanged the right to 
“market time”—or to make frequent transactions that the mutual 
fund otherwise prohibited because they reduced the value of the 
fund—for the commitment by the hedge fund to generate a certain 
amount of management fees by investing assets in a related mutual 
fund. These arrangements violated fiduciary duty and anti-fraud 
principles because mutual funds profited at the expense of investors 
while publicly proclaiming that they prohibited such practices. 
1. Mutual Funds.  A mutual fund is a pool of investments such 
as stocks or bonds managed by an expert. Investors who purchase 
shares in the fund pay annual fees equal to a percentage of the assets 
under management.131 The financial success of a mutual fund depends 
 
 129. On April 25, 2002, the SEC, NASD, NYSE and NASAA announced they were 
commencing a joint investigation with the New York Attorney General directed at research 
analysts. See Press Release, SEC, SEC Launches Inquiry into Research Analyst Conflicts (Apr. 
25, 2002), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2002-56.htm. 
 130. On December 20, 2002, regulators announced a $1.4 billion global settlement in 
principle with ten firms. See Press Release, SEC, SEC, NY Attorney General, NASD, NASAA, 
NYSE and State Regulators Announce Historic Agreement to Reform Investment Practices: 
$1.4 Billion Global Settlement Includes Penalties and Funds for Investors (Dec. 20, 2002), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2002-179.htm. On April 28, 2003, the regulators 
announced the final settlement with those firms as well as additional factual findings. See Joint 
Press Release, SEC et al., Ten of Nation’s Top Investment Firms Settle Enforcement Actions 
Involving Conflicts of Interest Between Research and Investment Banking: Historic Settlement 
Requires Payments of Penalties of $487.5 Million, Disgorgement of $387.5 Million, Payments of 
$432.5 Million to Fund Independent Research, and Payments of $80 Million to Fund Investor 
Education and Mandates Sweeping Structural Reforms (Apr. 28, 2003), available at http://www. 
sec.gov/news/press/2003-54.htm. The firms paid a total of $875 million in penalties and 
disgorgement, $432.5 million to fund independent research, and $80 million to fund and 
promote investor education. See id. The firms agreed to wide-ranging structural reform, 
essentially separating research and investment banking. See SEC, SEC Fact Sheet on Global 
Analyst Research Settlements, Apr. 28, 2003, http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/factsheet.htm. 
 131. See John P. Freeman & Stewart L. Brown, Mutual Fund Advisory Fees: The Cost of 
Conflicts of Interest, 26 IOWA J. CORP. L. 609, 614 (2001) (“Mutual funds historically have 
provided their shareholders with the ability to pursue a vast array of different investment 
objectives as co-owners of an entity offering three main services: diversified investment risk, 
professional investment management, and a redeemable security.”); SEC, Invest Wisely: An 
Introduction to Mutual Funds, http://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/inwsmf.htm (last visited Nov. 
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on its ability to attract assets.132 With the market decline of the early 
2000s, many mutual funds found the value of their assets shrinking as 
the value of their investments declined and investors pulled their 
money out of the stock market.133 Many mutual funds were forced to 
look for other ways to attract assets. One source of assets was hedge 
funds, which are investment vehicles limited to sophisticated 
investors. 
2. The New York Attorney General’s Investigation of Canary.  In 
2002, the New York Attorney General received a tip that a hedge 
fund, Canary Capital Partners, LLC, had entered into secret 
arrangements with mutual funds allowing it to profit at the expense of 
other mutual fund investors.134 The Attorney General’s subsequent 
investigation found that hedge funds were systematically taking 
advantage of arbitrage opportunities arising from peculiarities in the 
way that mutual funds are priced. In particular, they were engaging in 
a practice called market timing,135 which involves the frequent 
 
27, 2007); SEC, Mutual Funds, http://www.sec.gov/answers/mutfund.htm (last visited Nov. 27, 
2007). 
In the 1990s, mutual funds experienced unprecedented growth as millions of individuals 
began investing in securities in response to a rising stock market and the decline of traditional 
pension plans. See Mutual Funds: Who’s Looking Out for Investors?: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Capital Markets, Insurance, and Government Sponsored Enterprises of the H. 
Comm. on Financial Services, 108th Cong. 174 (2003) (testimony of Stephen M. Cutler, Dir., 
Div. of Enforcement, SEC) (“With more than 95 million Americans invested in mutual funds, 
representing approximately 54 million U.S. households, and a combined $7 trillion in assets, 
mutual funds are a vital part of this nation’s economy and millions of investors’ financial 
security.”); JOINT ECON. COMM., 107TH CONG., THE MUTUAL FUND INDUSTRY: AN 
OVERVIEW AND ANALYSIS 5 (2002) (reporting that mutual fund assets grew from $1.065 trillion 
in 1990 to $6.965 trillion in 2000). 
 132. See Ajay Khorana & Henri Servaes, Conflicts of Interest and Competition in the 
Mutual Fund Industry 2 (July 2004), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=240596 (“[T]he 
revenues of mutual funds families are a function of assets under management.”). 
 133. See Brian Reid & Stefan Kimball, Mutual Fund Industry Developments in 2002, 9 
INVESTMENT COMPANY INST. 1, 2–4 (2003) (describing outflow in mutual fund investments). 
 134. BROOKE A. MASTERS, SPOILING FOR A FIGHT: THE RISE OF ELIOT SPITZER 135–41 
(2006). 
 135. There were also allegations of “late trading,” which violated existing rules. See 17 
C.F.R. § 270.22c-1 (2007). This rule is referred to as the “forward pricing” rule. See Disclosure 
Regarding Market Timing and Selective Disclosure of Portfolio Holdings, Securities Act 
Release No. 8343, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,287, 68 Fed. Reg. 70,402, 70,403 
(proposed Dec. 17, 2003) (describing the rule as the “forward pricing” rule). In 1968, the SEC 
passed this rule “in order to reduce riskless short-term trading in mutual funds by eliminating 
the ability to use late-breaking news to take advantage of NAVs fixed before that news was 
released to the markets.” DH2, Inc. v. SEC, 422 F.3d 591, 593 (7th Cir. 2005). 
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purchase and sale of mutual fund shares to take advantage of “mutual 
fund mispricing that occurs when market prices for the fund’s 
underlying securities have become stale due to events after the 
relevant trading market has closed.”136 This occurs especially with 
respect to international markets because of time differentials. 
Because mutual funds are priced only once a day,137 the fund may rely 
upon the closing price of a foreign market that is several hours old in 
calculating the Net Asset Value (NAV) of the fund. To the extent 
that intervening events occur, that price may undervalue or overvalue 
the foreign security.138 Hedge funds can make a quick profit by buying 
or selling mutual fund shares with an undervalued or overvalued 
NAV. 
These practices harm the other investors in the mutual fund. 
First, market timing can lead to the dilution of investment gains.139 
When the value of a mutual fund increases, that gain is in a sense 
divided among the mutual fund’s investors. When a market timer 
comes in after the fact and captures part of the gain, the gain must be 
divided among more parties. Second, market timing increases the 
transaction costs of the mutual fund because the frequent activity 
leads to higher commission expenses.140 Mutual fund managers may 
find it harder to execute a long term strategy when they must buy and 
sell shares of stock in response to timing activity.141 
 
 136. DH2, Inc., 422 F.3d at 592; see also Canary Complaint, supra note 16, at para. 23 
(discussing the strategy of market timing in mutual funds). 
 137. See DH2, Inc., 422 F.3d at 592 (“A mutual fund’s share price does not fluctuate 
throughout the trading day, but the prices of the securities held by the fund do.”). 
 138. Id. at 593; see also Canary Complaint, supra note 16, at para. 23 (discussing how the 
market timing strategy involves using stale prices that do not reflect the value of a foreign 
security). 
 139. Canary Complaint, supra note 16, at para. 25; see also Jason T. Greene & Conrad S. 
Ciccotello, Mutual Fund Dilution from Market Timing Trades, 4 J. INVESTMENT MGMT. 31, 37 
(2006) (discussing a model of mutual fund dilution). 
 140. Canary Complaint, supra note 16, at para. 27; see also SEC v. Pimco Advisors Fund 
Mgmt. LLC, 341 F. Supp. 2d 454, 458 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (“[Market timing] can also harm 
investors . . . by increasing trading and brokerage costs, as well as tax liabilities, incurred by a 
fund and spread across all fund investors.”); Christopher Oster & Karen Damato, How Market 
Timers Can Drain Returns for Some Investors, WALL ST. J., Sept. 8, 2003, at C1 (“Waves of cash 
flowing rapidly in and out of a fund increase the commissions that managers pay to buy and sell 
securities, and those expenses eat into returns.”). 
 141. Canary Complaint, supra note 16, at para. 27; see also Pimco Advisors Fund Mgmt. 
LLC, 341 F. Supp. 2d at 458 (“The quick pace of investments and redemptions associated with 
market timing may also hinder the ability of mutual fund managers to act in the best interests of 
fund investors who seek to maximize their long-term investment gains. It would make little 
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Because it harms their investors, many mutual funds represented 
in their prospectuses that they prohibited market timing. Contrary to 
these representations, the mutual funds agreed to allow certain 
investors such as hedge funds to market time their funds in exchange 
for an agreement to retain a significant amount of assets in their 
funds.142 The mutual funds benefited because they earned 
management fees on these “sticky assets.” 
3. Lack of Regulation.  Why did compliance departments or 
regulators fail to prevent these practices? Although many mutual 
funds themselves prohibited market timing, there was no rule 
prohibiting investors from making multiple transactions in a mutual 
fund. Indeed, there was evidence that the SEC knew the industry was 
allowing market timing.143 The SEC, however, did not know of the 
agreements in which mutual funds allowed favored customers to 
market time in return for valuable consideration. Routine 
examinations of these mutual funds did not pick up the clandestine 
agreements to allow market timing because they did not review  
e-mails or trading activity.144 Without such agreements, it is not clear 
why market timing should be prohibited. The thought may have been 
that the market could take care of any abuses from market timing. 
Funds allowing market timing would disclose that fact to investors. If 
market timing affected the fund’s returns significantly, investors could 
choose to take their money elsewhere. 
 
sense for a fund manager to invest in assets with significant long-term potential but high short-
term volatility if a market timer’s redemptions could force the quick sale of fund assets.”). 
 142. Canary Complaint, supra note 16, at paras. 30–33. 
 143. See Windsor Sec., Inc. v. Hartford Life Ins. Co., 986 F.2d 655, 658 (3d Cir. 1993) (“[As 
early as 1993,] Hartford . . . began to observe a negative impact caused by market timing 
activity: increased trading and transaction costs, disruption of planned investment strategies, 
forced and unplanned portfolio turnover, lost opportunity costs, and large asset swings in a 
fund’s asset base that adversely affected Hartford’s ability to provide maximal investment 
return to all contract owners.”); Tamar Frankel & Lawrence Cunningham, The Mysterious Ways 
of Mutual Funds: Market Timing 235, 256 (Boston College Law School Faculty Papers, Paper 
187, 2007), available at http://lsr.nellco.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1188&context=bc/bclsfp 
(“The SEC knew of the excessive purchases and redemptions of mutual fund investors. 
However, it seems to have assumed, perhaps reasonably, that fund managers had self-interest in 
preventing harmful turnover of investments.”); Macey, supra note 103, at 965–66 (“Late trading 
and market timing were not only common practices, but the existence of such practices was well 
known to the SEC, which acquiesced in such practices until Mr. Spitzer came along to change 
the political climate.”). 
 144. See Memorandum from Lori A. Richards, Office of Compliance Inspections & 
Examinations, to William H. Donaldson, Chairman, SEC, 3 (Mar. 10, 2004), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/extra/apx-ts031004lar.pdf. 
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4. The Anti-Fraud and Fiduciary Duty Principles.  The New 
York Attorney General’s investigation established that the way in 
which mutual funds allowed market timing violated basic principles 
governing investment companies such as mutual funds. 
First, mutual funds that publicly proclaim they prohibit market 
timing while privately allowing it are making material 
misrepresentations to investors.145 An investor choosing such a mutual 
fund relies on the premise that the mutual fund will prohibit practices 
that harm the fund’s investors. By failing to disclose market timing 
arrangements, mutual funds harmed investors who might have chosen 
to place their assets in a mutual fund that did not allow timing of the 
market. This violates the anti-fraud principle embodied in section 
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Rule 10b-5, and the 
Martin Act.146 
Second, the market timing arrangements were illegal to the 
extent that the mutual fund managers benefited under those 
arrangements at the expense of their investors.147 Mutual fund 
managers are investment advisers and have basic fiduciary duties to 
their investors.148 A fundamental fiduciary principle is that the 
fiduciary may not benefit at the expense of the party to whom it has a 
fiduciary duty.149 Mutual fund managers benefited from market timing 
arrangements that harmed investors because they earned greater 
management fees. This violates the fiduciary duty principle embodied 
 
 145. See Pimco Advisors Fund Mgmt. LLC, 341 F. Supp. 2d at 464. 
 146. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2000); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 
(2007); see also Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 203 (1976) (noting that legislative 
history described section 10(b) as a “catchall” clause enabling the SEC “to deal with new 
manipulative [or cunning] devices” (quoting a statement of Thomas Corcoran made on behalf 
of the section’s drafters during the Hearings before the House Committee on Interstate and 
Foreign Commerce) (internal quotations omitted, bracketed insertion in original)). 
 147. See In re Mut. Funds Inv. Litig., 384 F. Supp. 2d 845, 856 (D. Md. 2005) (“Although 
market timing itself may be lawful, it nevertheless is prohibited by Rule 10b-5 if it is engaged in 
by favored market insiders at the expense of long-term mutual fund investors from whom it is 
concealed and who have a right to rely upon its prevention by fund advisers’ and managers’ 
good faith performance of their fiduciary obligations.”); Pimco Advisors Fund Mgmt. LLC, 341 
F. Supp. 2d at 472. 
 148. Investment Company Act of 1940 § 36(a), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35 (2000); SEC v. Capital 
Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 191 (1963) (“The Investment Advisers Act of 1940 
thus reflects a congressional recognition ‘of the delicate fiduciary nature of an investment 
advisory relationship,’ as well as a congressional intent to eliminate, or at least to expose, all 
conflicts of interest which might incline an investment adviser—consciously or unconsciously—
to render advice which was not disinterested.”); EBC I, Inc. v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 832 
N.E.2d 26, 31–32 (N.Y. 2005) (recognizing a common-law fiduciary duty). 
 149. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.01 (2006). 
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in the Investment Company Act of 1940 as well as common law 
principles. 
The New York Attorney General’s enforcement action 
demonstrated that market timing, although not itself illegal, was 
being conducted in a way that violated fundamental principles. The 
SEC followed the New York Attorney General’s lead, and the two 
regulators brought additional enforcement actions, which revealed 
that abusive market timing arrangements were widespread.150 As a 
result, the SEC proposed a wide range of new rules and regulations to 
reform the mutual fund industry.151 
III.  COMPETING PARADIGMS 
Although popular with the public, at least a portion of the 
business community has argued that principles-based enforcement 
actions are disruptive and unfair. For the most part, the regulated 
generally prefer the more predictable rulemaking approach. In 
contrast, the public generally prefers the decisiveness of principles-
based enforcement. To some extent, these attitudes reflect different 
assumptions about the regulatory scheme and its goals. In this Part, I 
show how rulemaking reflects an administrative paradigm preferred 
by the regulated whereas principles-based enforcement reflects a 
public values paradigm preferred by the public. 
 
 150. See, e.g., In re Canadian Imperial Holdings Inc., Securities Act Release No. 8593, 
Exchange Act Release No. 52,064, Administrative Proceeding File No. 3-11987 (July 20, 2005), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/33-8593.pdf; In re Banc of Am. Capital Mgmt., 
LLC, Securities Act Release No. 8538, Exchange Act Release No. 51,167, Investment Company 
Act Release No. 26,756, Administrative Proceeding File No. 3-11818 (Feb. 9, 2005), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/33-8538.htm; In re Janus Capital Mgmt. LLC, Investment 
Company Act Release No. 26,532, Administrative Proceeding File No. 3-11590 (Aug. 18, 2004), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/ia-2277.htm; In re Strong Capital Mgmt., Inc., 
Exchange Act Release No. 49,741, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,448, 
Administrative Proceeding File No. 3-11498 (May 20, 2004), available at http://www.sec. 
gov/litigation/admin/34-49741.htm; In re Mass. Fin. Servs. Co., Investment Company Act 
Release No. 26,347, Administrative Proceeding File No. 3-11393 (Feb. 5, 2004), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/ia-2213.htm; In re Alliance Capital Mgmt., L.P., Investment 
Company Act Release No. 26,312, Administrative Proceeding File No. 3-11359 (Dec. 18, 2003), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/ia-2205.htm. 
 151. See, e.g., Disclosure Regarding Market Timing and Selective Disclosure of Portfolio 
Holdings, Securities Act Release No. 8408, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,418, 69 
Fed. Reg. 22,300 (Apr. 23, 2004). 
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A. Rulemaking and the Administrative Paradigm 
There is evidence that for the most part, the regulated prefer that 
regulators utilize rulemaking over principles-based enforcement 
actions because it is a deliberative approach that they can influence.152 
The regulated may not be comfortable with applying broad principles 
to particular circumstances, an art monopolized by lawyers trained in 
common-law reasoning.153 Principles may give regulators discretion 
that potentially can be abused.154 The regulated want clear rules that 
specifically tell them what they cannot do, and more importantly, 
what they can do.155 The regulated may view questionable conduct as 
justified because the rules are unclear. They would prefer that the 
regulator clarify the law, not punish the conduct. 
The “Regulation by Enforcement” critique described in Part I of 
this Article reflects this mentality. The critique has tended to 
reemerge in response to periods of intensive enforcement activity. In 
2006 the Committee on Capital Markets Reform issued a report 
criticizing securities regulators for sidestepping the rulemaking 
process through enforcement actions.156 The sentiment reflected by 
this report is likely to be shared by a significant proportion of the 
regulated. 
Rulemaking reflects an administrative paradigm with three 
characteristics. First, regulatory norms should be defined through the 
application of administrative expertise. Second, regulatory norms 
should be defined through a broadly participative process. Finally, 
regulatory norms should be subject to a cost-benefit analysis. 
 
 152. In contrast, it is more difficult for the regulated to influence principles-based 
enforcement actions. See John T. Scholz & Feng Heng Wei, Regulatory Enforcement in a 
Federalist System, 80 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1249, 1250 (1986) (“[The] ability [of interest groups] to 
influence enforcement (as opposed to rulemaking) decisions—particularly in regulatory 
agencies . . . is limited by case processing requirements . . . .”). 
 153. See Kaplow, supra note 43, at 562–63 (“[S]tandards are more costly for legal advisors to 
predict or enforcement authorities to apply because they require later determinations of the 
law’s content.”). 
 154. For example, regulators may wrongly conclude that isolated misconduct is indicative of 
greater problems that may not exist, falling into the trap of the availability heuristic. See 
Stephen J. Choi & A.C. Pritchard, Behavioral Economics and the SEC, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1, 25–
26 (2003); Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law 
and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1519 (1998); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Rulemaking Versus 
Adjudication: A Psychological Perspective, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 529, 538–46 (2005). 
 155. See Sunstein, supra note 43, at 971–74. 
 156. See INTERIM REPORT ON CAPITAL MARKETS REGULATION, supra note 1, at 63–67. 
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1. Administrative Expertise.  The first assumption of the 
administrative paradigm is that regulatory norms should be 
developed by experts.157 Because the securities markets are complex, 
only specialists with experience are qualified to govern them and can 
assess what rules are appropriate.158 An administrative agency such as 
the SEC depends on its expertise to establish its legitimacy to 
regulate;159 and the SEC has such expertise because it deals with the 
securities industry on a constant basis—supervising registration of 
public offerings, inspecting brokerage firms, and encouraging investor 
education. Rulemaking allows experts with deep industry knowledge 
to carefully define regulatory norms.160 The rules that administrative 
experts promulgate are part of a coherent framework that takes into 
consideration the holistic experience of the agency.161 
 
 157. See Grundfest, supra note 52, at 1018 (observing that Congress “wanted to establish an 
agency that would specialize in securities-related matters and build expertise not easily captured 
within the legislature”); Jerry L. Mashaw & David L. Harfst, Regulation and Legal Culture: The 
Case of Motor Vehicle Safety, 4 YALE J. ON REG. 257, 305 (1987) (“Delegation is justified 
primarily by the complexity of the regulatory tasks assigned and the need for a high level of 
expertise.”); Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic State, 105 
HARV. L. REV. 1511, 1518–19 (1992) (describing a New Deal theory justification of bureaucracy 
based on agency expertise). 
 158. See Grundfest, supra note 52, at 966 (“Congress created the Commission as an expert 
agency with the capacity to address significant problems affecting the nation’s securities 
markets.”). 
 159. See Billing v. Credit Suisse First Boston Ltd., 426 F.3d 130, 172 (2005) (“The SEC and 
defendants have vigilantly reminded us that the securities markets in toto might be better 
entrusted to an expert agency than to the federal courts.”), rev’d on other grounds, 127 S. Ct. 
2383 (2007); SELIGMAN, supra note 32, at xix (“A primary purpose of ‘independent’ regulatory 
agencies like the SEC is to allow an experienced and expert staff to resolve specific, highly 
technical regulatory problems.”). Gerald Frug illustrates how the law legitimizes bureaucracies 
through a rhetoric of expertise. Gerald E. Frug, The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law, 
97 HARV. L. REV. 1276, 1322 (1984) (“The concept of administrative expertise, while not itself a 
‘doctrine,’ is part of the rhetoric of administrative law opinions that invokes the same kind of 
deference to bureaucratic decisions, with the same qualifications, when made by administrative 
agencies.”). 
 160. See Frug, supra note 159, at 1326 (“Administrators are ‘experts’; they decide many 
similar cases and they presumably come from backgrounds which make them specialists; all of 
this produces a special knowledge in addition to the record.”); Grundfest, supra note 52, at 967 
(arguing that the SEC should apply its expertise through rulemaking defining the scope of Rule 
10b-5); Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the Rulemaking Process, 41 
DUKE L.J. 1385, 1407 (1992) (“Much modern rulemaking is highly technical in nature.”). 
Of course, there may be cases in which this ideal is not met and not even the agency has 
true expertise. See McGarity, supra, at 1398 (“Although the theoretical rationale for creating 
regulatory agencies is to lodge decisionmaking power in the hands of experts, the scientific and 
technical needs of modern informal rulemaking have in many cases outstripped the expert 
resources of the agencies themselves.”). 
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The regulated might prefer regulation by experts because of the 
disruption that can occur when those who are perceived as 
nonexperts enter the scene. For example, after his investigation 
uncovered evidence of fraud, the New York Attorney General 
obtained an ex parte injunction against Merrill Lynch requiring it to 
implement certain measures with respect to its research practices.162 
Under the Investment Advisers Act, an investment adviser under a 
court injunction cannot offer investment advice.163 Thus, the 
injunction could have required Merrill Lynch to shut down its 
investment advisory business, causing substantial economic 
disruption. After the SEC pointed out this possibility, the injunction 
was suspended temporarily.164 This example could be used to argue 
that regulators who lack administrative expertise may cause 
significant disruption when they attempt to regulate the markets. 
2. Participative Process.  The second characteristic of the 
administrative paradigm is that norms should be defined through a 
process with procedural safeguards. Because the securities industry is 
so complex, even experts may make mistakes when promulgating 
rules. This possibility may be magnified when the conduct is in a gray 
area. Thus, the rulemaking process as governed by the Administrative 
Procedure Act requires that a rule may only be passed after the 
regulated and other interested parties are given notice and an 
opportunity to comment.165 The notice and comment period helps 
 
 161. See Frug, supra note 159, at 1298 (“The [bureaucratic] machine is also a highly 
technical and complex device, one that would be damaged by a mere layman’s tinkering.”); 
Jonathan R. Macey, Lawyers in Agencies: Economics, Social Psychology, and Process, 61 LAW 
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 109, 123–25 (1998) (“The shift to an agency process dominated by 
rulemaking reflected an embrace of the idea of a disinterested ‘science’ of rulemaking, in which 
quality of the decisions generated by technological sophistication triumphs over the quality of 
the decisions generated by the adversarial process.”). In contrast, a litigation approach may not 
adequately mobilize broad expertise. See Frederick Schauer, Do Cases Make Bad Law?, 73 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 883, 916 (2006) (“[C]ase-deciding bodies may not be well situated to engage in the 
large-number, systematic, and empirical inquiry that effective rulemaking requires.”). 
 162. See MASTERS, supra note 134, at 90, 92–93. 
 163. Investment Advisors Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(e)(4) (2000). 
 164. See MASTERS, supra note 134, at 93–94. 
 165. The Administrative Procedure Act requires agencies to give notice of “the terms or 
substance of the proposed rule” and “give interested persons an opportunity to participate in 
the rule making through submission of written data, views, or arguments with or without 
opportunity for oral presentation.” 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)–(c) (2000); see also Chamber of 
Commerce v. SEC, 443 F.3d 890, 899 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (discussing the Administrative Procedure 
Act’s requirement that agencies give notice of a proposed rule). 
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regulators ensure that they are not missing considerations that 
militate against the adoption of the rule.166 Part of the reason for 
allowing such collaboration is that the regulated may have expertise 
and knowledge that regulators do not.167 
The regulated prefer an approach that allows them to mitigate 
rules that they perceive as unwise and unduly burdensome. 
Regulation FD offers an example of how the notice and comment 
process works. As initially written, Regulation FD applied to all 
company employees.168 The regulated argued successfully through the 
comment process that the rule was too broad. If it were applied to all 
employees, mid-level employees might not be able to communicate 
with suppliers without worrying that they might divulge material 
nonpublic information. The SEC agreed and limited the reach of 
Regulation FD to senior management and those employees who 
regularly deal with research analysts.169 Arguably, the notice and 
comment process prevented the promulgation of an overly broad 
legal norm. 
After the passage of Regulation FD, the SEC went out of its way 
to persuade the regulated that Regulation FD would not cause undue 
disruption. The SEC chief of enforcement took pains to provide 
reassurances that “[d]espite the securities industry’s outcry against 
Regulation FD and the flood of alarmist client letters from law firms, 
Regulation FD was not intended to be revolutionary.”170 This 
comment reflects a desire to take into account the needs of the 
regulated in formulating norms in order to minimize disruption. By 
doing so, the rulemaking approach may be taking into account the 
 
 166. See NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 295 (1974) (“[R]ulemaking would 
provide the Board with a forum for soliciting the informed views of those affected in industry 
and labor before embarking on a new course.”); Prentice, supra note 118, at 802 (“When the 
SEC considers new rules, it uses a process that guarantees that it will receive information and 
arguments from all points of view, unlike an individual decision maker prone to seeking out 
only information to support preexisting views.”); Seidenfeld, supra note 157, at 1561 (arguing 
that rulemaking allows for greater deliberation by providing access to different views). 
 167. See Choi & Pritchard, supra note 154, at 24 (“Devising new regulations is costly, 
requiring analysis of complicated economic phenomena. Market participants are likely to know 
far more about these phenomena than regulators.”). 
 168. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Securities Act Release No. 7,787, Exchange 
Act Release No. 42,259, Investment Company Act Release No. 24,209, 64 Fed. Reg. 72,590 
(proposed Dec. 28, 1999). 
 169. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Securities Act Release No. 7,881, Exchange 
Act Release No. 42,43,154, Investment Company Act Release No. 24,599, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,716 
(Aug. 24, 2000). 
 170. Walker, supra note 40. 
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political reality that the regulated may mobilize against rules they 
perceive are too burdensome. 
3. Use of Cost/Benefit Analysis.  A third feature of the 
administrative paradigm is the use of cost-benefit analysis in 
constructing rules.171 Under the National Securities Market 
Improvement Act of 1996, the SEC is required to consider in its 
rulemaking process “whether the action will promote efficiency, 
competition, and capital formation.”172 This cost-benefit analysis 
requirement limits the types of norms that the rulemaking process 
may promulgate. Unless an agency can show that a rule is 
economically efficient, its power to adopt such a rule can be limited 
by the courts. The administrative paradigm thus envisions that 
proposed regulations will be assessed in economic terms.173 
The regulated prefer a cost-benefit approach because it puts the 
burden on the regulator to prove a change in the status quo is 
necessary. The D.C. Circuit’s review of rules passed by the SEC after 
the mutual fund scandal illustrates how this burden plays out. The 
D.C. Circuit struck down the rule requiring that 75 percent of a 
mutual fund board be comprised of independent directors.174 It did so 
because the SEC had not adequately assessed the cost of the rule.175 
B. Principles-Based Enforcement Actions and the Public Values 
Paradigm 
The public is likely to demand that regulators move quickly 
against industry exploitation. When the public perceives that the 
 
 171. See Macey, supra note 161, at 125 (“[I]n the rulemaking context, government lawyers 
are supposed to be weighing both the costs and the benefits of their actions when formulating 
rules.”). 
 172. National Securities Market Improvement Act of 1996 § 106, Pub. L. No. 104-290, 110 
Stat. 3416, 3425 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). Executive agencies are required to 
go through a more formal cost-benefit analysis under executive orders issued by President 
Reagan in 1981 that have essentially been ratified by other administrations. 
 173. The emphasis on cost-benefit analysis with respect to regulations is likely to continue. 
In 2006, the Committee on Capital Markets Reform recommended that the SEC should 
implement a formal process akin to that of executive agencies and “engage in a more risk-based 
process, focused explicitly on the costs and benefits of regulation.” INTERIM REPORT ON 
CAPITAL MARKETS REGULATION, supra note 1, at 8, 60–62. 
 174. See, e.g., Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, 443 F.3d 890, 908–09 (D.C. Cir. 2006); 
Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, 412 F.3d 133, 144–45 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
 175. Chamber of Commerce, 412 F.3d at 144 (“[T]he Commission violated its 
obligation . . . to consider the costs imposed upon funds by the two challenged conditions.”). 
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securities markets are stacked against it, it will demand action to 
restore balance. Rulemaking may not meet these demands because it 
can be slow.176 
Principles-based enforcement actions may allow regulators to 
respond to such demands. By articulating public values, such actions 
may decisively address public concerns.177 A rulemaking response may 
be perceived as weak and ineffectual, especially if rulemaking failed 
to prevent the problems causing the public’s outrage.178 The 
principles-based enforcement actions discussed in Part II are 
illustrative. Renewed public interest in abusive practices may have led 
to Wall Street Journal articles that spurred investigations into abuses 
relating to the IPO allocation process.179 Regulators such as the New 
York Attorney General responded to public outrage over high-profile 
scandals and the perceived ineffectiveness of the SEC by investigating 
industry wrongdoing.180 Partly in response to the public sentiment, the 
SEC followed the lead of the New York Attorney General and 
became more aggressive itself. When regulators found significant 
evidence of wrongdoing, they acted decisively, satisfying the public’s 
demands. 
 
 176. See Kaplow, supra note 43, at 562 (“Rules are more costly to promulgate than 
standards because rules involve advance determinations of the law’s content . . . .”); McGarity, 
supra note 160, at 1387 (“[I]t is difficult to disagree with the conclusion that it is much harder for 
an agency to promulgate a rule now than it was twenty years ago.”); Ronald J. Pierce, Jr., Two 
Problems in Administrative Law: Political Polarity on the District of Columbia Circuit and 
Judicial Deterrence of Agency Rulemaking, 1988 DUKE L.J. 300, 301–02 (“[A]n agency 
realistically must conclude that making an important policy decision through the rulemaking 
process will require it to commit a significant proportion of its scarce resources to that process 
for as much as a decade.”). 
 177. See Lawrence A. Cunningham, Principles and Rules in Public and Professional 
Securities Law Enforcement: A Comparative U.S.-Canada Inquiry, 6 CANADA STEPS UP 255, 
312 (2006) (“An enforcement policy should be supplemented, from time to time, by focused 
enforcement activity trained on publicly visible crises. These may erupt as a result of 
insufficiently specified underlying laws that require enforcement activity bearing a more 
principles-like character, although some public debacles also involve bald violation of clear 
rules. Either way, enforcement activities that consciously respond to public outcries are 
intended to promote all securities regulation’s goals, of efficiency and fairness and of confidence 
and protection. They do so by highlighting and then exterminating behavior deemed 
undesirable based upon the public rebuke that provokes stepped-up enforcement.”). 
 178. The public generally will cast aside expertise when it is perceived as ineffectual. As 
James Q. Wilson explains, “Americans value expertise but they do not defer to it; an expert who 
takes an unpopular position or acts contrary to the self-interest of an individual or group will be 
treated as roughly as any other adversary.” JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY 304 (1989). 
 179. See supra note 75 and accompanying text. 
 180. See supra Part II.B.2; see also MASTERS, supra note 134, at 75–79 (discussing 
investigations performed by the New York Attorney General). 
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In contrast to the administrative paradigm, which emphasizes the 
use of experts, collaboration, and cost-benefit analysis, principles-
based enforcement actions focus on the need to apply societal norms 
to industry misconduct. The conduct targeted by the principles-based 
actions discussed in Part II was not wrong simply because it violated 
NASD Rule 2110, the Martin Act, and common-law fiduciary duties. 
It was wrong because it violated basic principles against commercial 
bribery, fraud, and self-dealing embodied in those rules, statutes, and 
common law. These principles reflect widely accepted societal values 
that can only be given meaning through particular application, often 
referred to as “public values.”181 
The public values paradigm has three characteristics. First, 
regulatory norms are defined by regulators with enforcement 
expertise rather than administrative expertise. Second, regulatory 
norms are defined by a closed process rather than a participatory 
process. Finally, regulatory norms embody public values rather than 
economic values. 
1. Enforcement Expertise.  In most cases, enforcement attorneys 
are general experts in the litigation and investigative process rather 
than any particular substantive area of the law.182 This may be 
especially true when state securities regulators are bringing a suit as 
opposed to the SEC. Even the SEC’s enforcement staff do not have 
the day-to-day interaction with industry that staff in other divisions 
such as corporate finance do.183 Moreover, enforcement actions filed 
 
 181. The concept of public values was first articulated in the realm of constitutional law, 
where scholars such as Owen Fiss argued that adjudication allows courts to give meaning to the 
public values embodied in broad constitutional phrases. Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court: 
1978 Term, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 2 (1979). William Eskridge applied the idea to the realm of 
statutory interpretation when he observed that statutes embody broad public values that should 
influence the way such statutes are interpreted. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Public Values in 
Statutory Interpretation, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1007, 1036 (1989) (“[S]tatutes themselves can be the 
source of public values.”). As Eskridge notes, it is extremely difficult to precisely define the 
meaning of public values. See id. at 1036 n.2. I do not attempt to set forth a general theory of 
public values with respect to securities regulation, but instead identify particular values 
expressed by recent enforcement actions. See supra Parts II.A.4, II.B.4, II.C.4. 
 182. See Macey, supra note 161, at 123–25 (contrasting the role of generalist lawyers in 
adjudication with the use of experts in the rulemaking process); Mashaw & Harfst, supra note 
157, at 263 (noting in case study of National Highway Traffic Safety Administration that the 
agency was utilizing “case-by-case adjudication which requires little, if any, technological 
sophistication and which has no known effects on vehicle safety”). 
 183. Of course, the Commissioners of the SEC must approve actions by the Enforcement 
Division. 
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in civil court by the SEC or state securities regulators have the 
potential to be decided by nonexpert judges and juries. 
The enforcement process relies upon intensive fact gathering and 
the application of legal principles to those particular facts rather than 
a comprehensive study of regulatory issues. This process crystallizes 
the issues and focuses attention on problem areas that may not have 
been evident to rulemakers. The cases resulting from the application 
of litigation expertise may resonate more powerfully with the public 
than technical rules. The New York Attorney General’s enforcement 
cases illustrate the role of generalists in defining public values. The 
New York Attorney General and his staff members drew on their 
general experience as public prosecutors and litigators rather than 
any particularized expertise with respect to the industry in 
investigating and bringing cases against research analysts and the 
mutual fund industry.184 Their investigations led to examples of 
wrongdoing that resonated with the public and resulted in significant 
reform. 
2. Closed Process.  In contrast to the administrative paradigm, 
which is premised on broad participation in defining regulatory 
norms, the public values paradigm envisions a closed process with two 
parties, the regulator and the target. Rather than eliciting industry 
opinion through a notice and comment process, principles-based 
enforcement actions use document subpoenas and investigative 
testimony to elicit facts. Although the knowledge developed by 
principles-based enforcement does not necessarily reflect a wide 
range of opinions,185 it tends to be more detailed and relevant than the 
information generated by the rulemaking comment process. 
A closed process allows regulators to negotiate reforms in 
response to a particular wrong without industry interference. They 
can then spur change by applying reforms derived from settlements to 
those who committed similar types of wrongdoing. For example, in 
the Merrill Lynch case, as a result of specific evidence of wrongdoing 
by its research analysts, Merrill Lynch negotiated a settlement that 
 
 184. See MASTERS, supra note 134, at 133–69. 
 185. See Croley, supra note 2, at 116 (“While the effects of adjudicatory decisions can, like 
rulemakings, be far reaching, adjudication processes are less open.”); McGarity, supra note 160, 
at 1393 (observing that, unlike rulemaking, adjudication fails to provide for notice and 
comment, thus “both regulatees and regulatory beneficiaries are deprived of the open 
opportunity that informal rulemaking provides to influence the agencies’ thinking”). 
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established norms governing the relationship between its investment 
banking and research departments.186 This settlement was the model 
for a global settlement involving the other major investment banking 
firms that implemented significant structural reforms.187 In addition, 
the case helped spur rulemaking that caused significant change. Once 
one party agrees to a set of reforms, there is momentum that can be 
difficult to resist.188 
3. Application of Values.  Rather than using the language of 
cost-benefit analysis, the public values paradigm relies upon the 
rhetoric of values. Principles-based enforcement actions do not ask 
whether a legal norm is economically efficient or technically sound, 
but whether the conduct violates an established principle.189 The 
securities laws do not just reflect economic norms. For example, 
Donald Langevoort observes that the insider-trading laws are partly 
based on “the belief in the expressive function of law generally—the 
idea that both law and society are better off if the law systematically 
expresses certain virtues.”190 Principles-based enforcement actions 
give meaning to the public values reflected in principles by applying 
 
 186. MASTERS, supra note 134, at 102. 
 187. See supra note 115 and accompanying text. 
 188. This has been controversial. As the Commission on the Regulation of U.S. Capital 
Markets in the 21st Century reported: 
[T]he Commission repeatedly heard concerns about the SEC’s use of ‘undertakings’ 
in enforcement action settlements to impose requirements that suggest industry-wide 
application to regulated entities. . . . [T]he concerns addressed instances in which the 
SEC required an undertaking in a settlement agreement that itself constituted a 
change in the law, which was then later applied to the entire securities industry. 
COMM’N ON THE REGULATION OF U.S. CAPITAL MARKETS IN THE 21ST CENTURY, REPORT 
AND RECOMMENDATIONS 123 (Mar. 2007), available at http://www.capitalmarketscommission. 
com/portal/capmarkets/default.htm. 
 189. For example, in the context of automobile safety, Professor Mashaw and Mr. Harfst 
observe that issues are framed technically when rulemaking is involved, and framed in 
layperson’s terms in enforcement cases involving defective vehicles. See Mashaw & Harfst, 
supra note 157, at 304 (“[T]he defects question is not framed as a technological, scientific, or 
economic issue. The questions are straightforward and commonsensical. Should people expect 
steering arms to break, wheels to collapse, or windshield wipers to fly off? Obviously not.”). 
Of course, there is a large body of economics literature that analyzes enforcement 
decisions through a cost-benefit framework. See, e.g., George J. Stigler, The Optimum 
Enforcement of Laws, 78 J. POL. ECON. 526, 526–27 (1970) (arguing that society gives up 
complete enforcement of a rule because enforcement is costly). But as a practical matter, there 
are no legal standards requiring agencies to consider cost-benefit factors in deciding whether to 
bring an enforcement case. 
 190. Donald C. Langevoort, Rereading Cady, Roberts: The Ideology and Practice of Insider 
Trading Regulation, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1319, 1328 (1999). 
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them to particular situations. Principles-based regulation requires the 
regulated to act as moral agents who assess whether their conduct 
conforms with the principles reflecting those values, not just whether 
their conduct violates a cost-effective rule. 
The language of public values can resonate more powerfully with 
the public than the rhetoric of costs and benefits. In contrast to the 
collaborative dialogue associated with Regulation FD, the New York 
Attorney General’s rhetoric in connection with the research analyst 
case illustrates the public values approach. On announcing the case, 
the New York Attorney General stated: “This was a shocking 
betrayal of trust by one of Wall Street’s most trusted names . . . . The 
case must be a catalyst for reform throughout the entire industry.”191 
This approach conveys a sense that a fundamental value has been 
breached, not just that an economically efficient rule was violated. 
With such a breach, the regulator asserts authority rather than 
persuasion in establishing a legal norm. 
C. Tension between Paradigms 
Rulemaking and principles-based enforcement actions thus 
reflect different assumptions about the regulatory scheme and its 
purposes. The administrative paradigm emphasizes a predictable 
regulatory regime whereas the public values paradigm emphasizes the 
punishment of misconduct. These paradigms reflect the dualism in 
society’s relationship with markets. Society views markets through a 
pragmatic, utilitarian lens, as a wealth generator that should be 
regulated with care. This mentality is reflected in discourse that a 
stable regulatory regime may make markets more attractive to 
foreign companies.192 Rulemaking and the administrative paradigm fit 
within this vision. But society also disapproves of systematic 
exploitation of the public by the market. Perhaps the public reaction 
to the scandals uncovered by securities regulators reflects an 
underlying consensus that such conduct violates basic public values. 
To the extent that markets rely upon public confidence, there is a 
need to address these concerns through aggressive enforcement. 
In an ideal world, these paradigms would easily coexist. 
Regulators would predict problem areas, promulgate cost-effective 
 
 191. Press Release, Office of the N.Y. State Att’y Gen., Merrill Lynch Stock Rating System 
Found Biased by Undisclosed Conflicts of Interest: Spitzer Obtains Court Order Requiring Key 
Disclosure (Apr. 8, 2002), available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2002/apr/apr08b_02.html. 
 192. See INTERIM REPORT ON CAPITAL MARKETS REGULATION, supra note 1, at 66. 
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rules, and companies that violate those rules would be punished. The 
regulated would be committed to following basic principles and those 
who did not would be punished. And perhaps there are times when 
there is such equilibrium. 
Regulators certainly use both tools in responding to arguable 
misconduct. All of the principles-based enforcement actions discussed 
in Part II led to significant rulemaking. The sequence, though, makes 
a difference. When principles-based enforcement actions are the first 
response, rulemaking tends to mirror reforms implemented by the 
settlement terms of the principles-based enforcement action.193 
Indeed, the Committee on Capital Markets Regulation has criticized 
such rules as not conforming with normal rulemaking procedures.194 
In contrast, when rulemaking is the initial response, subsequent 
enforcement is more likely to be rules-based, not principles-based. 
The reality is that there are times when there is tension between 
the paradigms. The rules do not anticipate significant issues and the 
regulated are either unaware that their conduct violates principles or 
simply ignore them. As a result, regulators must choose between a 
rulemaking response that may be perceived as deliberative but 
coddling industry and a principles-based enforcement response that is 
decisive but seen as disruptive. 
To some extent, the surge in principles-based enforcement 
actions discussed in Part II can be seen as a temporary rejection of 
the administrative paradigm in favor of a public values approach. The 
result has been a significant amount of controversy as evidenced by 
the reemergence of the “Regulation by Enforcement” critique.195 The 
administrative paradigm can be less disruptive than the public values 
paradigm because it cloaks regulation in the neutral language of 
administrative expertise and cost-benefit analysis. The shift from 
rulemaking’s rhetoric of utility and cost-benefit analysis to the moral 
tone of enforcement actions unleashed previously repressed 
controversy about the shape of public values.196 Some may argue that 
regulators, who are not necessarily elected, should not have the 
 
 193. See supra notes 95, 151 and accompanying text. 
 194. See INTERIM REPORT ON CAPITAL MARKETS REGULATION, supra note 1, at 66. 
 195. See supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
 196. See Dan M. Kahan, The Secret Ambition of Deterrence, 113 HARV. L. REV. 413, 414 
(1999) (describing the role of the deterrence idiom in muting societal conflict relating to 
controversial norms). 
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power to define those values on an ad hoc basis.197 The subjects of 
principles-based enforcement actions may feel unfairly persecuted 
based on what they perceive is an illegitimate vision of the public 
good that may not be universally accepted. 
IV.  CHOOSING BETWEEN RULEMAKING AND ENFORCEMENT 
Given the tension between the administrative and public values 
paradigms, how do regulators choose between rulemaking and 
principles-based enforcement actions in responding to arguable 
misconduct?198 This Part first observes that in light of the respective 
preferences of the public and the regulated, public choice theory 
might contend that principles-based enforcement actions are more 
likely when public influence is high and rulemaking is more likely 
when the regulated have greater influence. This Part then argues that 
this account is incomplete because regulators are more constrained in 
their choices than public choice theory assumes. Even if they are 
constrained, regulators should counter the perception that interest 
 
 197. See, e.g., Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2353 
(2001) (“[A]gency experts have neither democratic warrant nor special competence to make the 
value judgments—the essentially political choices—that underlie most administrative 
policymaking.”); Seidenfeld, supra note 157, at 1570–71 (noting risk that administrative 
“decisionmakers will implement their idiosyncratic conceptions of the public interest rather 
than society’s consensus about that interest”). 
 198. Of course, one might argue that the SEC did not really choose to bring a principles-
based enforcement action in the research analyst and mutual fund cases. Rather, the SEC was 
pressured by the success of the New York Attorney General’s approach to bring its own cases. 
It is difficult to know whether the SEC would have taken the same approach without the 
prompting of the New York Attorney General. In any event, the SEC at the very least had the 
discretion to follow the New York Attorney General’s lead in bringing principles-based 
enforcement actions. And the New York Attorney General had the choice to defer to the SEC’s 
rulemaking approach. 
As noted before, under Chenery, it is widely accepted that administrative agencies have 
broad discretion in making such choices. Elizabeth Magill theorizes that courts give agencies 
such leeway because they can regulate the aftereffects of agency decisions. See Magill, supra 
note 2, at 1437 (“Courts’ ability to shape some of the consequences of an agency’s choice of 
procedure explains the continued strength of the Chenery principle.”). This dynamic was 
evident in the mutual fund cases. Regulators chose to use enforcement actions to impose fines 
and structural reforms such as requiring that a settling mutual fund agree that 75 percent of its 
board would consist of independent directors. The SEC then attempted to apply the 75 percent 
independent director requirement to the mutual fund industry as a whole through rulemaking. 
See Investment Company Governance, 69 Fed. Reg. 3472 (proposed Jan. 23, 2004). The rule was 
challenged and the D.C. Circuit struck it down on the basis that the SEC had not adequately 
assessed the cost of the rule. See Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, 443 F.3d 890, 908–09 (D.C. Cir. 
2006); Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, 412 F.3d 133, 144–45 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
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groups drive their choices by considering certain criteria to guide 
their choices. Finally, this Part offers such a framework. 
A. Public Choice Theory and Regulatory Choice 
Many commentators have observed that there is a relationship 
between the business cycle and the production of securities 
regulation.199 During boom times, industry has more influence, there 
is less public demand for regulation, regulators tend to be more 
cautious, and less new regulation is produced. Busts tend to reveal 
scandals that cause public outrage, reducing industry influence, 
emboldening regulators, and leading to the passage of more 
restrictive laws. An example of such a law is the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 
which Congress passed in response to public pressure after the 
collapse of Enron.200 
These arguments can be seen as a form of public choice theory, 
which has long been an influential framework for explaining the 
production of regulation. In essence, public choice theory predicts 
that interest groups, including industry and regulators themselves, can 
influence the type of regulation produced.201 Variations of this theory 
predict different outcomes. The earliest form of public choice theory 
argued that for the most part, industries would capture regulatory 
agencies and that regulation would usually be produced for the 
 
 199. See, e.g., Erik F. Gerding, The Next Epidemic: Bubbles and the Growth and Decay of 
Securities Regulation, 38 CONN. L. REV. 393, 396 (2006) (discussing the interplay between the 
business cycle, the cycle of investor confidence/investor trust, and the political 
economy/regulatory cycle); Joseph A. Grundfest, Punctuated Equilibria in the Evolution of 
United States Securities Regulation, 8 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 1, 1 (2002) (noting that changes in 
securities law have been provoked by perceived failures in the capital markets); Larry E. 
Ribstein, Bubble Laws, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 77, 79–83 (2003) (describing the boom-bubble-bust-
regulate cycle of financial market regulation). See generally Stuart Banner, What Causes New 
Securities Regulation? 300 Years of Evidence, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 849 (1997) (arguing that new 
technology over time has not caused new securities regulation, but rather, crashes have); Frank 
Partnoy, Why Markets Crash and What Law Can Do About It, 61 U. PITT. L. REV. 741 (2000) 
(using finance and legal scholarship to critique theories of why markets crash, and to make 
recommendations regarding what law can do about crashes). 
 200. Roberta Romano argues that statutes passed after periods of market turmoil often 
contain problematic provisions and that such statutes should provide for reevaluation at a later 
date. See Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate 
Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521, 1599–1602 (2005). 
 201. See Vivek Ghosal & Joseph Gallo, The Cyclical Behavior of the Department of Justice’s 
Antitrust Enforcement Activity, 19 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 27, 30 (2001); Sam Peltzman, Toward a 
More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J.L. & ECON. 211, 212 (1976); George Stigler, The 
Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. 3, 4 (1971). For a summary of public choice 
theory, see Croley, supra note 2, at 34–41. 
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benefit of the regulated.202 Later versions were less pessimistic and 
observed that regulators would balance the demands of the regulated 
with the demands of the public.203 Regulators are constrained in their 
capacity to give in to the regulated to the extent that doing so harms 
the public interest and their own interests. Thus, regulation can be 
seen as a function of balancing competing interest group preferences. 
The boom/bust literature essentially links the relative influence 
of the regulated and public with the production of regulation. This 
literature, however, does not differentiate among types of securities 
regulation, and focuses largely on the passage of statutes by 
Congress.204 The question of how interest groups can affect the choice 
between rulemaking and principles-based enforcement actions by 
securities regulators has not been examined.205 
If one accepts the argument that the public generally prefers 
principles-based enforcement whereas the regulated prefer 
rulemaking, public choice theory might predict that regulators will be 
more likely to punish arguable misconduct with principles-based 
enforcement when public influence is high and address arguable 
misconduct through rulemaking when the influence of the regulated 
is high. When there is an economic collapse, the public may perceive 
that the bust is caused by industry wrongdoing. The public may press 
for regulatory action and regulators will respond by acting 
aggressively to find and punish blatant misconduct. On the other 
hand, when the economy is booming, the public may demand less 
action and the regulated will have more sway. As a result, regulators 
may act more cautiously and collaboratively through rulemaking. 
Public choice theory might also explain the resurgence of actions 
by state regulators. When the influence of the regulated is high, the 
SEC may become captured and more likely to act slowly through 
rulemaking. State regulators have incentives to fill the gap by 
bringing aggressive principles-based enforcement actions that 
resonate with the public. The SEC might then be forced to respond in 
turn by following the lead of state regulators to regain its credibility 
with the public. 
 
 202. See Stigler, supra note 201, at 3. 
 203. See Peltzman, supra note 201, at 212. 
 204. See supra note 199 and accompanying text. 
 205. See Magill, supra note 2, at 1442–43 (“There are few efforts to describe or explain how 
agencies choose among their available policymaking forms.”). 
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Over time, the public choice model would predict shifts in 
regulatory choice. To the extent that one group’s interests are met, 
the other group’s interests are antagonized, leading that group to 
mobilize to further its interests. A period of extensive principles-
based enforcement actions may cause a backlash that will make 
regulators more cautious and shift to rulemaking responses to 
arguable misconduct. A period in which an overly cautious 
rulemaking response predominates may cause significant regulatory 
gaps, increasing industry exploitation of the public, leading to greater 
public demand for regulatory action.206 
One can interpret the shift from rulemaking to principles-based 
enforcement actions as an example in which the choice of one 
regulatory tool led to conduct requiring the choice of a different 
regulatory tool. Prior to the actions described in Part II, the influence 
of the regulated through the “Regulation by Enforcement” critique 
fostered a tendency to respond to arguable misconduct through 
rulemaking. For various reasons, industry began acting more 
aggressively in areas in which rules were unclear, arguably ignoring 
fundamental principles.207 As the public became more invested in the 
market and concerned about corporate failures such as Enron, the 
demand for decisive action became greater. Securities regulators 
became more aggressive in issuing subpoenas and uncovered abuses 
fostered in areas in which there were regulatory gaps. As a result, 
there was a shift to principles-based enforcement actions and the 
public values paradigm. 
Public choice theory might predict that the prevalence of 
principles-based enforcement actions and the public values paradigm 
may have sown the seeds for a regulatory shift back to an emphasis 
on rulemaking and the administrative paradigm. The regulated have 
 
 206. See John C. Coates, IV, Private vs. Political Choice of Securities Regulation: A Political 
Cost/Benefit Analysis, 41 VA. J. INT’L L. 531, 535 (2001) (predicting that devolution of securities 
regulation would lead to backlash and reregulation). 
 207. As Joel Seligman describes: 
A widespread belief evolved in the United States financial community that time 
honored rules such as those that discourage conflicts of interest were quaint and 
easily circumvented. Too frequently, sharp practitioners in business, investment 
banking, accounting or law challenged the fundamental tenets of “full disclosure of 
material information” or “fair presentation of accounting results.” A deterioration in 
the integrity of the corporate governance and mandatory disclosure systems occurred, 
not because of a novel strain of human cupidity, but because there was so much 
success, for so long, that some began to forget why fundamental principles of full 
disclosure and corporate accountability long were considered essential. 
SELIGMAN, supra note 32, at 623. 
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begun mobilizing in response to perceived regulatory overreaching.208 
Since 2006, three high-profile reports by the Committee on Capital 
Markets Regulation, McKinsey & Co., and the Commission on the 
Regulation of U.S. Capital Markets in the 21st Century have argued 
that the regulatory climate is too harsh and may deter foreign issuers 
from raising funds in the United States.209 Targets may be more likely 
to fight, raising the cost of bringing principles-based enforcement 
actions.210 
The public’s demand for change may have been sated by the 
flurry of regulatory activity described in Part II. Over time, regulators 
may exhaust the cases in which there is clear evidence of specific 
conduct causing public harm. As a result, the determinants of 
regulatory choice may move back toward rulemaking and the 
administrative paradigm. 
B. Limits of the Public Choice Theory 
Regulators would object to the public choice explanation of their 
regulatory decisions. They would do so primarily on the ground of 
professionalism.211 Regulators, for the most part, do not view 
themselves as taking action based on the influence of interest 
groups.212 And indeed, their decisions are subject to important 
constraints. In particular, regulators might argue that their choice of a 
regulatory tool is largely determined by the nature of the evidence of 
arguable wrongdoing they find. 
To bring a principles-based enforcement action, there must be 
particularized evidence of conduct that violates a principle. Without 
such evidence, any action would fail. The principles-based 
 
 208. See, e.g., INTERIM REPORT ON CAPITAL MARKETS REGULATION, supra note 1, at xi 
(arguing that the increase in regulatory intensity in the U.S. has hurt its markets). 
 209. See id.; MCKINSEY & CO., supra note 7, at ii; COMMISSION ON THE REGULATION OF 
U.S. CAPITAL MARKETS IN THE 21ST CENTURY, supra note 187, at 1. 
 210. See Scholz & Wei, supra note 152, at 1253 (“Business, on the other hand, can increase 
the cost of enforcement actions [through appeals].”). 
 211. See id. at 1251 (“[Many studies] discount political influences over bureaucratic 
activities, explaining agency behavior in terms of the professionalism of enforcement staffs, 
established work routines, task requirements for detecting and prosecuting violations, attitudes 
towards regulated firms, and more idiosyncratic behavior of inspectors.”). 
 212. A regulator would contend that its choices are unlike the legislative responses to 
recessions described in the boom/bust literature. Legislatures have more discretion to pass 
legislation for political reasons. Indeed, that is their job. Securities law statutes are rarely, if 
ever, challenged on constitutional grounds. In contrast, regulators must assume they will have to 
prove their cases in court and must follow administrative procedures when passing rules. 
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enforcement actions described in Part II succeeded not simply 
because they catered to a public need, but because they uncovered 
documents such as e-mails detailing the wrongdoing.213 It was this 
evidence that spurred the public outrage leading to substantial 
reforms. Regulators would point out that if they simply brought 
principles-based enforcement actions without such evidence, there 
would be little likelihood that the allegations would have a significant 
public impact, making it less likely that a target would feel pressure to 
settle the case, thereby increasing the cost of principles-based 
enforcement. More importantly, they would not be acting consistent 
with their duty as officers of the court if they brought actions without 
a basis. 
Regulators might also point out that they do not use rulemaking 
simply to cater to the regulated. Rulemaking may be spurred when 
there is generalized evidence of a problem but no specific evidence of 
particular wrongdoing. In some circumstances, rules can have a more 
significant impact on misconduct than isolated enforcement actions. 
Indeed, the principles-based enforcement actions discussed in Part II 
may have had the greatest impact in the way that they resulted in 
systemic rulemaking. Moreover, regulators would object to the idea 
that they are simply captured by industry through the rulemaking 
process. Regulators would contend that their duty is to act in the 
public interest and that they do not blindly craft rules that favor the 
regulated. 
Moreover, a critic of public choice theory might argue that its 
conception of causation is too simplistic. It is difficult to distinguish 
between cause and effect with respect to regulatory choices. Although 
public attention may spur principles-based enforcement, it may be 
just as likely that principles-based enforcement spurs public attention. 
Similarly, though industry influence may lead to rulemaking, the 
decision to use rulemaking may lead to industry influence. 
A proponent of public choice theory might respond that 
although responsiveness to interest groups may not totally determine 
regulatory choice, it must have some impact. Despite the 
professionalism of regulators, it is hard to deny that the public’s 
attention may magnify the impact of the cases they bring. For 
example, the actions against the research analysts may not have 
 
 213. See CSFB Complaint, supra note 16, at paras. 31–45; Canary Complaint, supra note 16, 
at paras. 59–62, 68–72, 75–76, 89, 93; Dinallo Aff., supra note 16, at 2, 17. 
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resonated as much if they had not come after a significant market 
meltdown. And there may be more pressure to bring questionable 
cases when public pressure is high. Certainly regulators have 
incentives to search for particular evidence of wrongdoing after 
periods of excess. But that does not mean that they always find it. 
Regardless of whether regulators are influenced by public sentiment, 
their actions will not have significant impact if they are based on no 
more than speculation. 
The truth is likely somewhere in between. Regulators have 
greater incentives to respond to arguable misconduct by developing 
principles-based enforcement cases when public influence is high, but 
they are subject to an important constraint—they must find specific 
evidence of wrongdoing. In contrast, regulators may have a greater 
incentive to respond to arguable misconduct through rulemaking 
when the influence of the regulated is high, but they are subject to the 
constraint that they must follow procedures meant to protect the 
public interest. 
C. A Framework for Determining Regulatory Choice 
Even assuming there are meaningful constraints on regulatory 
choice, regulators should counter the perception that they cater to 
specific interests. Shifts in regulatory emphasis from rulemaking to 
principles-based enforcement can create instability. Although legal 
transitions are inevitable and perhaps no different economically than 
other unexpected occurrences affecting markets such as storms or 
recessions,214 it can be difficult for firms to meaningfully assess the 
risks of regulatory shifts.215 With the surge in principles-based 
enforcement actions described in Part II, there is a perception among 
some that the regulatory system is in disarray, with authority 
emanating from too many sources.216 
The tension between the administrative and public values 
paradigms is at the heart of the problem. On the one hand, the 
 
 214. Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 HARV. L. REV. 509, 534 
(1986) (“[T]here is little to distinguish losses arising from government and market risk. For 
purposes of analyzing risk and incentive issues, the source of the uncertainty is largely 
irrelevant. A private actor should be indifferent as to whether a given probability of loss will 
result from the action of competitors, an act of government, or an act of God . . . .”). 
 215. See INTERIM REPORT ON CAPITAL MARKETS REGULATION, supra note 1, at 66 
(“When new standards are introduced through specific enforcement actions and only later 
codified as explicit rules, confusion and distrust are likely to be the consequences.”). 
 216. See MCKINSEY & CO., supra note 7, at 81–85. 
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administrative framework is meant to provide a set of cost-effective 
rules that the regulated can rely upon in assessing their conduct. On 
the other, the reality is that these rules are not perfect and that the 
regulated must also assess their conduct in relation to abstract 
principles. Because there has been little effort to synthesize these two 
schemes, the regulatory system seems chaotic. 
But the tension between the administrative and public values 
paradigms should not be seen as an inevitability. There is no reason 
why the paradigms cannot coexist. A regulatory system can give clear 
notice of actionable conduct while punishing conduct that violates 
public values. Both rulemaking and principles-based enforcement 
actions serve important functions in defining regulatory norms. 
Some of these concerns might be addressed by a clearer 
framework for assessing when a principles-based enforcement 
approach is appropriate. Such a framework should attempt to referee 
the tension between the overlapping but distinct frameworks of rules 
and principles. To the extent that regulators are guided by such a 
framework, they might mitigate concerns that they are disrupting the 
rulemaking regime mainly in response to public pressure. Moreover, 
if regulators have clearer guidance as to when it is appropriate to use 
a principles-based enforcement action, they can act decisively when 
the proper situation arises, reducing the risk of agency capture. 
Such a framework should be synthetic, in that it balances the 
concerns of the administrative paradigm—fair notice, collaboration, 
and cost-effective norms—with the concerns of the public values 
paradigm—confrontation of wrongdoing that violates fundamental 
values. Regulators should consider four criteria in determining 
whether principles-based enforcement or rulemaking is appropriate 
in responding to arguable misconduct. 
First, is the principle to be applied in the absence of a clearly 
applicable rule well established, or is it novel? If the principle is well 
established, then the fair notice concerns of the administrative 
paradigm might be addressed. Moreover, the conduct would more 
likely implicate the fundamental values that are part of the public 
values paradigm. If the principle is novel, then fair notice concerns 
become more significant and the conduct may be less likely to violate 
values on which there is societal consensus. 
Second, is the issue raised by the misconduct addressed by 
existing rules, or is there an inadvertent gap in the rules that has been 
exploited? If the rulemaking process envisioned the alleged 
misconduct and decided it should not be prohibited, then the 
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regulated may be entitled to rely upon the judgment of the rules 
framework. On the other hand, if the rulemaking process simply 
failed to envision the issue and the regulated are merely exploiting a 
gap, there may be less of a need to refrain from punishing the conduct 
with a principles-based enforcement action. 
Third, is there particularized evidence of wrongdoing, or is there 
only generalized evidence of wrongdoing? If there is particularized 
evidence establishing the wrongdoing, there may be a greater case for 
choosing a principles-based enforcement action, but if the evidence of 
wrongdoing is more generalized, rulemaking might be more 
appropriate. 
Fourth, is the public harmed in a significant way by the 
misconduct? Did the wrongdoer know that the misconduct would 
cause public harm? If misconduct has minimal effects on the public, 
the case for punishing the misconduct with a principles-based 
enforcement action is weaker. If the misconduct causes significant 
public harm and the wrongdoer is aware the conduct will cause harm, 
the case for confronting such wrongdoing with a principles-based 
enforcement action is stronger. 
To illustrate this synthetic framework in a more concrete way, I 
apply it to five possible scenarios of arguable misconduct (these are 
not meant to be exhaustive): 
(1) conduct violates a principle set forth in a rule; 
(2) conduct violates both a rule and a principle; 
(3) conduct is in an area that is unregulated by rules, does not 
violate a rule, but violates a principle; 
(4) conduct is in an area that is heavily regulated by rules, does 
not violate a rule, but violates a principle; and 
(5) conduct is sanctioned by a rule but violates a principle. 
The case for choosing a principles-based action in response to 
arguable misconduct is strongest in situation (1) and weakest in 
situation (5). 
1. Conduct Violates a Principle Set Forth in a Rule.  When 
conduct violates a principle set forth in a rule, it is more likely that 
the principle is well established and the regulated should be aware 
that they will be subject to that principle. Thus, the case for a 
principles-based enforcement action can be strong. 
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The primary example of a principle embodied by a rule is the 
anti-fraud principle set forth in SEC Rule 10b-5.217 There is broad 
societal agreement that fraud harms the public because it leads to 
inefficient markets and is morally reprehensible.218 Because the 
principle has been applied in a wide variety of cases over time, courts 
have been able to create limitations governing anti-fraud actions. 
Those limits include the requirement that wrongdoers act with 
scienter, or recklessness, in order for liability to attach, as well as that 
the fraud is material, or likely to affect the decision of a reasonable 
investor.219 Because the anti-fraud principle has been defined by both 
rulemaking and adjudication, it is the quintessential example of a well 
established principle.220 
Moreover, when a principle is embodied in a rule, it is more 
likely that actions enforcing the principle are consistent with the 
regulatory scheme. For example, although there are rules that 
exhaustively detail the types of information a company must disclose 
for a securities offering,221 anti-fraud actions can also be brought 
targeting misrepresentations and omissions not covered by those 
rules. No one argues that these actions somehow disrupt the rules 
governing the disclosure process. 
The case for bringing a particular anti-fraud action turns on 
whether there is specific evidence of such fraud. The case against 
Merrill Lynch for fraudulent misstatements by research analysts was a 
fairly straightforward application of the anti-fraud principle. There 
was specific and powerful evidence from which fraud could be 
reasonably inferred. Although Merrill Lynch may have been able to 
argue with the characterization of the facts, if the allegations were 
true and research analysts knowingly misrepresented the prospects of 
companies, such conduct contravened a well established principle 
 
 217. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2007). 
 218. See, e.g., Ackerman v. Schwartz, 947 F.2d 841, 847 (7th Cir. 1991) (“The optimal 
amount of fraud is zero.”). 
 219. See TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976); Ernst & Ernst v. 
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 203 (1976). 
 220. Of course, there is always room for more clarity with respect to the standard of liability. 
See INTERIM REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON CAPITAL MARKETS REGULATION, supra note 1, 
at 12, 80 (arguing that the SEC should further define the elements of Rule 10b-5). 
 221. 17 C.F.R. pts. 210, 228. 
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contained in a rule. Thus, there was a strong case for a principles-
based enforcement action.222 
2. Conduct Violates both a Rule and a Principle.  When conduct 
violates both a rule and a principle, the case for a principles-based 
enforcement action can also be strong. Even if the principle is not 
well-defined, if the conduct independently violates a rule, the 
wrongdoer has notice that the conduct is prohibited. Moreover, it 
may be likely that if the conduct is condemned by both a rule and a 
principle, the application of the principle is in accord with existing 
rules. The principle and rule working in tandem may provide a strong 
case for condemning certain conduct. Of course, the decision will 
likely hinge on the strength of the evidence establishing misconduct 
as well as whether the conduct caused public harm. 
The CSFB case is an example of an instance in which conduct 
violated both a rule and a principle. The quid pro quo arrangements 
in which CSFB traded a share in IPO profits for kickbacks arguably 
violated NASD Rule 2330(f), which prohibits profit sharing 
arrangements.223 But if that had been the only violation, there may not 
have been sufficient justification for a $100 million sanction. NASD 
Rule 2330(f) was meant to protect consumers and no consumers were 
directly harmed. The conduct not only violated the text of a specific 
rule, it also violated a broader principle against bribery in commercial 
transactions.224 The rule and the principle in this case worked in 
tandem. NASD Rule 2330(f) explained why the conduct was 
technically wrong, the anti-commercial bribery principle explained 
why the conduct was fundamentally wrong and was punished so 
harshly. The evidence of quid pro quo arrangements was specific and 
strong, and there was an argument that such commercial bribery 
tainted the public markets. Thus, there was a case for a principles-
based enforcement action. 
3. Conduct Is Unregulated by a Rule but Violates a Principle.  A 
more difficult case is when conduct occurs in an area that is 
unregulated by rules but violates a principle. In such circumstances, 
the regulator will have to carefully assess whether the violated 
 
 222. The question of the appropriateness of the structural reforms that resulted should be 
addressed in a separate paper. 
 223. See supra note 77 and accompanying text. 
 224. See supra notes 88–89 and accompanying text. 
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principle is well established and whether the lack of rules is deliberate 
or just an inadvertent gap. The regulated might argue that the fact 
that there is no rule indicates that regulators have sent the message 
that the conduct will be unregulated.225 The regulated may argue that 
in such cases, the arguable misconduct should be excused and 
rulemaking used to prohibit the conduct going forward. As with all 
cases, the decision to proceed by principles-based enforcement 
actions in such circumstances will rely heavily on the specificity of the 
evidence and the extent of public harm. 
The mutual fund cases fit within this scenario. There were no 
rules regulating market timing but the existence of market timing 
arrangements may have violated fiduciary duty principles.226 One 
could argue that the application of fiduciary duty principles was 
novel. Although the idea that investment advisers were fiduciaries 
was long established, there was relatively little precedent for 
aggressively enforcing these duties through principles-based 
enforcement.227 Of course, there was also an anti-fraud theory. Mutual 
funds publicly proclaimed that they prohibited market timing to their 
investors while secretly and knowingly allowing some investors to do 
it in exchange for compensation. Although there were no rules 
specifically prohibiting market timing arrangements, there is no 
indication that this gap was a deliberate part of the regulatory 
scheme. There was clear evidence of market timing arrangements in 
e-mails.228 Moreover, mutual funds were clearly aware that these 
market timing arrangements hurt investors because of their policies 
prohibiting market timing.229 In sum, there was a strong case that 
principles-based enforcement actions were an appropriate response 
to market timing arrangements. 
 
 225. See SEC v. Pimco Advisors Fund Mgmt. LLC, 341 F. Supp. 2d 454, 471 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) 
(noting that defendant “seeks to avoid liability by asserting what may be considered the 
‘everyone was doing it’ defense; since secret market timing arrangements were widespread in 
the industry . . . [the defendant] seems to suggest that he cannot be charged with violating his 
own fiduciary duties towards his investors”). 
 226. Of course, there was a rule prohibiting late trading. See 17 C.F.R. § 270.22c-1 (2007). 
But that rule did not address the issue of market timing. 
 227. See Lori A. Richards, Dir., Office of Compliance Inspections & Examinations, SEC, 
Speech to the Eighth Annual Investment Adviser Compliance Summit, Wash., D.C.: Fiduciary 
Duty: Return to First Principles (Feb. 27, 2006), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/ 
spch022706lar.htm. 
 228. See Canary Complaint, supra note 16, at paras. 76, 89. 
 229. See id. at paras. 34, 74, 84–85, 92, 94; see also supra note 142 and accompanying text. 
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4. Conduct Is in an Area Heavily Regulated by Rules but 
Violates a Principle.  The case for using a principles-based 
enforcement action may be more controversial when the conduct is in 
an area heavily regulated by rules, does not violate a rule, but violates 
a principle. In such a case, one might make an argument similar to the 
rationale for the implied immunity doctrine, which immunizes actors 
from antitrust liability when there is a clear repugnancy between the 
securities laws and antitrust principles.230 But the analogy is not 
perfect because a securities law principle is more likely to be in 
accordance with the underlying system of rules than an antitrust 
principle. 
Accounting fraud cases often fit this scenario. Accounting 
decisions are made pursuant to technical rules that are arguably 
comprehensive. Yet that has not precluded principles-based 
enforcement actions when there is specific evidence of wrongdoing 
violating a well established principle. The decision by Judge Henry 
Friendly in United States v. Simon231 is illustrative. In that case, the 
defendants, who were auditors, argued they could not be found guilty 
of participating in a financial fraud if the financial statements 
complied with Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). 
The district court judge instead instructed the jury that the “‘critical 
test’ was whether the financial statements as a whole ‘fairly presented 
the financial position of [the audited company]’” and that although 
compliance with GAAP was persuasive, it was not conclusive in 
establishing good faith.232 Judge Friendly approved the charge, 
holding that compliance with GAAP did not excuse the accountants 
from complying with the greater principle that “an accountant is 
under [a] duty to disclose what he knows when he had reason to 
believe that, to a material extent, a corporation is being operated not 
to carry out its business in the interest of all the stockholders but for 
 
 230. See Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Billing, 127 S. Ct. 2383, 2392 (2007). Clear 
repugnancy is determined through consideration of four factors: 
(1) the existence of regulatory authority under the securities law to supervise the 
activities in question; (2) evidence that the responsible regulatory entities exercise 
that authority; and (3) a resulting risk that the securities and antitrust laws, if both 
applicable, would produce conflicting guidance, requirements, duties, privileges, or 
standards of conduct. . . . (4) . . . the possible conflict affect[s] practices that lie 
squarely within an area of financial market activity that the securities law seeks to 
regulate. 
Id. 
 231. United States v. Simon, 425 F.2d 796 (2d Cir. 1969). 
 232. Id. at 805–06. 
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the private benefit of its president.”233 Under Simon, it appears that 
principles-based enforcement actions relating to accounting may be 
appropriate when there is clear evidence that the accountant’s 
inaction, although not violating GAAP, violates the accountant’s 
fundamental duty to disclose certain types of material self-dealing.234 
5. Conduct Is Sanctioned by a Rule but Violates a Principle.  The 
case for a principles-based enforcement action is weakest when the 
conduct is sanctioned by a rule but arguably violates a principle. In 
such a case, even if the principle is well established, the application of 
the principle would not be in accordance with the underlying 
regulatory scheme. Such a situation likely raises the same concerns 
addressed by the implied immunity doctrine, which immunizes 
conduct when there is a “clear repugnancy” between the regulatory 
system and liability standard,235 and applying the principle would lead 
to “duplicative and inconsistent standards.”236 
An example is the scrutiny of “soft dollar” payments made by 
institutional investors such as mutual funds to brokers. As discussed 
earlier, only a portion of the commission for a stock transaction pays 
for the actual execution of the transaction. Part of the commission is 
understood as paying for research and other services. Section 28(e) of 
the Securities Exchange Act expressly permits this practice.237 After 
the regulatory attention of the market timing scandals, there was 
renewed scrutiny of “soft dollar” payments. There were reports that 
“soft dollar” payments were being used not only to pay for research, 
but other expenses such as computers, overhead, and tickets to 
sporting events.238 Although such payments might violate certain 
fiduciary duty principles, Section 28(e) might be fairly read to allow 
such practices. Because the application of the fiduciary duty principle 
to such conduct would be novel and not in accordance with the 
regulatory scheme, a principles-based enforcement action might not 
 
 233. Id. at 806. 
 234. And the “fairly presents” principle has been codified by Sarbanes-Oxley. See Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002 § 906(a), 18 U.S.C. § 1350 (Supp. V 2005). 
 235. See Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC, 127 S. Ct. at 2391. 
 236. Id. Of course, the “implied immunity” standard has not been applied to bar liability 
based on the securities laws, and I do not mean to imply that it should, but the concept is useful 
in analyzing the interaction between rules and principles. 
 237. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 28(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(e) (2000). 
 238. See, e.g., Christopher Oster & Tom Lauricella, Mutual Funds’ Soft Fees Getting a Hard 
Look, WALL ST. J., Dec. 26, 2003, at C1. 
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be appropriate. Consistent with this approach, the SEC has addressed 
the issue by providing interpretative guidance with respect to the 
scope of Section 28(e).239 
Regulators should be cognizant, though, of attempts to falsely 
characterize conduct as being sanctioned by rules. One example is the 
case of Enron and its treatment of Special Purpose Vehicles (SPVs). 
Enron’s argument for the legitimacy of these SPVs was that an 
independent entity had a 3 percent ownership interest in the SPVs, 
and thus they could be treated as off Enron’s balance sheet. Enron’s 
argument implied that there was a 3 percent rule under GAAP under 
which it could account for SPVs in this way. But there was no such 
rule. As William Bratton explains, the purported rule derived from a 
1991 letter from the SEC accountant, which “never intended three 
percent to be taken as a one-size fits-all test.”240 Indeed, “[s]ince 1991, 
the SEC has insisted repeatedly that there is no three percent 
test . . . .”241 Thus, the argument that such conduct is immune from 
attack by principles-based enforcement actions falls flat. 
*          *          * 
Public choice theory might predict that regulators choose 
between principles-based enforcement actions and rulemaking based 
on the relative influence of the public and the regulated. Although 
the choice is certainly influenced by the economic and social climate, 
regulators are constrained in their choice by the type of evidence they 
uncover. The challenge of choosing between principles-based 
enforcement and rulemaking is synthesizing the concerns of the 
administrative and public law paradigms. In making this choice, 
regulators should consider whether the principle they are enforcing is 
novel or well established, whether the principle is in accord with 
existing rules, whether there is compelling evidence establishing the 
wrongdoing, and whether the public is harmed. 
 
 239. Indeed, the SEC published guidance on the scope of Section 28(e) in 2006. See 
Commission Guidance Regarding Client Commission Practices Under Section 28(e) of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Release No. 34–54165, 71 Fed. Reg. 41,978 (July 24, 2006). 
 240. William W. Bratton, Enron, Sarbanes-Oxley and Accounting: Rules Versus Principles 
Versus Rents, 48 VILL. L. REV. 1023, 1043 (2003). 
 241. Id. 
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CONCLUSION 
At first glance, securities regulation appears to be comprised of 
two incompatible competing paradigms. The collaborative approach 
of the administrative paradigm at times does not fit with the 
confrontational approach of the public values paradigm. The result, it 
seems, is a system oscillating arbitrarily between accommodating 
rulemaking and disruptive principles-based enforcement actions. The 
resurgence of principles-based enforcement actions has given rise to 
renewed criticisms of “Regulation by Enforcement.” Public choice 
theory would argue that these aggressive enforcement actions are 
merely a response to greater public influence in the wake of a market 
collapse. 
But although the economic climate can create greater incentives 
for regulators to punish questionable behavior, the regulatory 
response is not just determined by politics. In all of the major 
enforcement actions described in this Article, regulators uncovered 
specific evidence of conduct that did not violate a specific rule but 
transgressed a well established principle in ways that harmed the 
public and the market. Regulators must construct a compelling case 
of misconduct that violated fundamental public values, or rulemaking 
will be the appropriate response. 
Despite these constraints, regulators should do more to 
synthesize the values embodied by the administrative and public 
values paradigms. The regulatory scheme should embody both 
predictability and a concern for public values. In deciding how to 
respond to arguable misconduct, regulators should carefully consider 
whether the principle they are enforcing is well established, whether 
its application coheres with existing rules, whether there is compelling 
evidence of misconduct, and whether the conduct targeted caused 
foreseeable harm to the public. By doing so, regulators can take a 
meaningful step toward harmonizing a system that relies on both 
specific rules and general principles. 
